Principles of Risk Management

Chapter 8
Alternative Risk Transfer and Reinsurance

Post Graduate Program in Insurance Management
Principles of Risk Management   •   Post Graduate

Alternative Risk Transfer and Reinsurance

Introduction and context

Risk financing determines how an organisation funds the economic consequences of uncertain loss. Traditional insurance transfers a defined risk to an insurer in exchange for premium, but it is not the only available mechanism. Organisations may retain losses, establish reserves, create a captive insurer, transfer risks through capital markets, or combine several methods in an integrated programme. Reinsurance enables insurers and reinsurers to redistribute portfolios, stabilise results, protect capital and increase underwriting capacity.

Alternative risk transfer (ART) is not simply a substitute for insurance. It is a design discipline that combines insurance, finance, capital markets, derivatives, contractual risk allocation and enterprise risk management. The appropriate structure depends on loss frequency and severity, risk appetite, capital cost, liquidity needs, tax and accounting treatment, regulatory requirements, data quality and the availability of risk capacity.

Learning objectives

By the end of this chapter, the reader should be able to:

  1. Distinguish risk retention, self-insurance, reserves, captives and market-based transfer.
  2. Compare traditional indemnity insurance with parametric and capital-market solutions.
  3. Explain proportional and non-proportional reinsurance structures.
  4. Calculate basic retention, quota-share, surplus, excess-of-loss and aggregate covers.
  5. Evaluate basis risk, counterparty risk, collateral, moral hazard and regulatory constraints.
  6. Design a governance framework for an integrated risk-financing programme.

1. The architecture of risk financing

A risk-financing decision begins with the loss distribution rather than with a particular product. Frequency is the expected number of loss events in a period; severity is the monetary size of an individual loss. High-frequency, low-severity losses are often economical to retain because transaction costs and premiums may exceed expected claims. Low-frequency, high-severity losses are more suitable for insurance, reinsurance or capital-market protection because they can threaten solvency or liquidity.

A useful decomposition of the annual cost of a risk-financing programme is:

Total cost = retained losses + risk-transfer premium + operating and transaction costs + capital cost

This is an economic decision framework, not an accounting identity. Retained losses are expected and unexpected losses funded by the organisation; the premium includes the insurer’s expected claims, expenses, cost of capital and profit margin; capital cost reflects funds committed to support the retained exposure or collateral. Tax, accounting and regulatory effects may alter the decision.

The expected loss for discrete possible losses is:

E[L] = ∑ᵢ pᵢLᵢ

where Li is loss amount i, pi is its probability, and the probabilities sum to one. This expected value does not describe volatility or the possibility of ruin. Two risks can have the same expected loss but radically different tail behaviour. Therefore, decision-makers also assess variance, tail value-at-risk, stress scenarios, liquidity-at-risk and required capital.

Retention and self-insurance

Retention means that the risk bearer, rather than an external insurer, finances some or all of the loss. It may be deliberate, as with a deductible, or involuntary, as when coverage is unavailable. Self-insurance is a broad managerial arrangement in which an organisation deliberately funds retained losses, usually through a loss fund, budget allocation or internal reserve. It is not necessarily insurance in the legal sense because it may lack risk transfer and the pooling of independent risks.

Advantages include lower frictional costs, control over claims handling, access to investment income, flexibility and avoidance of insurer profit margins. Disadvantages include capital strain, adverse loss development, management distraction, possible under-reserving and exposure to a single organisation’s loss experience. Self-insurance is most appropriate when losses are predictable, manageable and sufficiently frequent, while catastrophic layers are transferred externally.

A reserve is an accounting or financial provision for expected obligations. It does not automatically create cash, legal risk transfer or solvency protection. A reserve may be funded or unfunded; this distinction is critical. A funded reserve holds liquid assets, whereas an unfunded reserve is only an accounting recognition of an expected liability.

Deductibles and self-insured retentions

A deductible reduces the amount payable by the insurer for each covered loss. Under an ordinary deductible d, the insurer payment for loss L is:

I(L) = max(L − d, 0)

A self-insured retention (SIR) generally requires the insured to handle and fund losses up to the retention before the insurer responds. Contract wording determines whether defence costs erode the SIR, whether the retention applies per occurrence or in aggregate, and whether the insured must fund payment before reimbursement. These differences can be economically significant.

2. Captive insurance

A captive is an insurance company established primarily to insure or reinsure risks of its parent organisation, affiliated companies or a defined group. A pure captive serves one corporate group; a group captive serves several unrelated or related participants; an association captive serves members of an association. A rent-a-captive provides access to captive infrastructure without the insured establishing a wholly owned insurer.

A captive can retain predictable layers, access reinsurance, improve data and claims control, and address risks that commercial insurers price inefficiently or exclude. It can also coordinate global programmes and support disciplined risk management. However, a captive involves capital, licensing, actuarial, audit, governance, tax, compliance and operational costs. It must be a genuine risk-bearing entity, not merely a financing shell.

Captive feasibility should consider:

  • credible exposure and claims data;
  • adequate premium volume and diversification;
  • capital and surplus requirements;
  • actuarial reserving and claims administration;
  • domicile regulation and reporting;
  • fronting, collateral and reinsurance costs;
  • tax, transfer-pricing and accounting consequences; and
  • board oversight and conflicts of interest.

The captive’s board must approve underwriting limits, investment policy, reserving standards, reinsurance purchases, related-party transactions and risk appetite. Solvency must be assessed under adverse scenarios, not only expected loss.

3. Finite risk and structured risk transfer

Finite-risk arrangements combine limited risk transfer with substantial timing, funding or investment elements. Examples include multi-year aggregate covers, loss portfolio transfers, adverse development covers and experience-rated contracts. The insurer may accept underwriting risk, but the limits, premiums, loss corridors, experience accounts or refund provisions can make the transfer more constrained than under conventional insurance.

A loss portfolio transfer (LPT) transfers a portfolio of known claims, usually including incurred but not reported claims, to another risk bearer for a premium. An adverse development cover protects against deterioration of reserves above an agreed attachment point. These solutions can release management attention and reduce uncertainty, but they require reliable reserving, careful contract analysis and clear recognition of whether significant insurance risk has actually transferred.

Finite structures raise important accounting and regulatory questions. If the arrangement is substantially a deposit or financing transaction, it may not receive the same accounting treatment as insurance. Regulators and auditors examine cancellation rights, experience refunds, loss corridors, recourse, collateral and the magnitude of transferred underwriting risk. Transparency is preferable to designing complexity solely to obtain a preferred accounting result.

4. Parametric insurance

Parametric insurance pays when an objectively measured parameter crosses a defined threshold, rather than reimbursing the insured’s actual physical loss. Parameters may include wind speed, earthquake intensity, rainfall, temperature, river level or an industry index. A contract might pay when a specified wind speed is recorded at an agreed location.

The principal advantage is speed: claims can be settled rapidly without extensive loss adjustment. Parametric covers can respond to contingent business interruption, public-sector liquidity needs and protection gaps where conventional loss measurement is difficult. They also offer transparent triggers and can reduce disputes about indemnity valuation.

The central limitation is basis risk: the payment may differ from the insured’s actual economic loss. Basis risk has two forms. The insured may suffer loss without the trigger being reached, or the trigger may be reached without a corresponding loss. Location, measurement methodology, data quality, threshold selection and payout function must therefore be tested against historical and simulated events.

A simple linear payout function is:

P(x) = min(Lₘₐₓ, max(0, Lₘₐₓ × (x − t) ÷ (e − t)))

Here x is the observed parameter, t is the attachment threshold, e is the exhaustion threshold, and Lmax is the maximum payout. This formula applies only when the contract specifies a linear payout between attachment and exhaustion, with no payout below t and full payout at or above e. Units must be consistent: if x is measured in metres per second, both thresholds must use metres per second.

Parametric contracts require independent data sources, a defined observation period, robust contingency procedures, and protection against manipulation. They should be modelled using joint simulations of the trigger and the insured’s actual loss, not trigger probability alone.

5. Insurance-linked securities and catastrophe bonds

Insurance-linked securities (ILS) transfer insurance risk to capital-market investors. Catastrophe bonds, or cat bonds, are the most prominent example. A sponsor pays a premium to a special purpose vehicle (SPV). Investors provide collateral, commonly invested in high-quality assets, and receive a risk premium. If a defined catastrophe occurs, some or all collateral is used to pay the sponsor; otherwise investors receive principal at maturity.

Cat bonds may use indemnity triggers, industry-loss triggers, parametric triggers or modelled-loss triggers. Indemnity triggers best match the sponsor’s actual loss but expose investors to claims uncertainty and moral hazard. Parametric triggers are transparent and rapid but introduce basis risk. Industry-loss triggers reduce moral hazard but may not match the sponsor’s own portfolio.

ILS can provide multi-year capacity, diversify sources of protection and reduce dependence on traditional reinsurance. Risks include model uncertainty, trigger mismatch, collateral investment risk, basis risk, legal complexity, investor concentration and changing capital-market conditions. A catastrophe bond is not automatically cheaper than reinsurance; its value may lie in capacity, duration and diversification.

Other ART mechanisms include contingent capital, weather derivatives, industry loss warranties, collateralised reinsurance, protected cell companies and public-private catastrophe pools. Contingent capital provides funding after a specified event, often through a pre-arranged loan or equity facility. Unlike insurance, it may create debt or dilution precisely when the organisation is financially stressed.

6. Reinsurance: purpose and classification

Reinsurance is an agreement under which a reinsurer accepts specified risks ceded by an insurer. The insurer remains responsible to the original policyholder under the principle commonly called the follow-the-fortunes or follow-the-settlements doctrine, subject to contract terms and applicable law. Reinsurance supports capacity, solvency, catastrophe protection, earnings stability, portfolio management and entry into new classes or territories.

Reinsurance can be classified by relationship and by risk allocation. Facultative reinsurance is negotiated for an individual risk. Treaty reinsurance automatically covers a defined portfolio under agreed terms. Proportional reinsurance shares premiums and losses according to a stated proportion. Non-proportional reinsurance responds when losses exceed an attachment point or when aggregate losses exceed a threshold.

Proportional reinsurance

Under quota-share reinsurance, the reinsurer accepts a fixed percentage of every policy within scope. If the quota share is q, ceded premium and ceded loss are:

Ceded premium = q × written premium
Ceded loss = q × covered loss

The cedant retains 1 − q. A quota share provides automatic capacity and balance-sheet relief but cedes profitable as well as unprofitable business. It may include a ceding commission to reimburse acquisition and administration expenses. Commission structures must be assessed for profitability, sliding-scale adjustments and incentives.

Under surplus-share reinsurance, the cedant retains a fixed number of lines, each line being a multiple of the retained amount. The reinsurer accepts the portion above the cedant’s retention up to the treaty limit. For a risk with sum insured S, retention R, and no treaty limit reached, the ceded proportion is:

Ceded proportion = max(0, S − R) ÷ S

This expression assumes the reinsurer covers the amount above R and that S exceeds zero. Surplus share is more selective than quota share and is useful when policy sizes vary substantially. It requires accurate classification of sums insured and careful management of treaty lines.

Non-proportional reinsurance

An occurrence excess-of-loss treaty responds when a loss exceeds the attachment point. If the loss is L, attachment is A, and limit is U, the reinsurer’s payment is:

R(L) = min(max(L − A, 0), U)

The layer is often described as “U excess of A”. The cedant retains the first A; the reinsurer pays up to U above it; losses above A + U remain with the cedant or are passed to another layer. The contract must define occurrence, hours clauses, reinstatements, exclusions, loss adjustment expenses and aggregation.

An aggregate excess-of-loss cover responds when the aggregate losses during a period exceed an annual attachment. If annual aggregate loss is T, attachment is A, and limit is U, payment is:

Rₐ(T) = min(max(T − A, 0), U)

Aggregate covers protect earnings against accumulation of many losses, while occurrence covers protect against a single large event. Both may be needed in catastrophe-exposed portfolios.

A stop-loss treaty pays when the ratio of losses to premium exceeds an agreed threshold. If losses are T, subject premium is V, and the attachment ratio is a, the attachment in monetary terms is aV. The treaty payment is subject to its limit and contract definition:

Payment = min(max(T − aV, 0), limit)

The loss ratio must be defined consistently, including treatment of reinstatement premiums, commissions, large losses and reserves.

Worked example: proportional and excess-of-loss protection

An insurer writes a portfolio with annual written premium of 10 million monetary units and expects covered losses of 6 million. It cedes 40% under a quota-share treaty. The ceded premium is:

0.40 × 10 = 4 million

The ceded expected loss is:

0.40 × 6 = 2.4 million

The insurer retains 60% of the premium and expected loss: 6 million premium and 3.6 million expected loss, before expenses and commissions.

Separately, an occurrence cover is written at 5 million excess of 10 million. For a covered occurrence loss of 13 million, the reinsurer pays:

min(max(13 − 10, 0), 5) = 3 million

For a loss of 20 million, payment is 5 million, not 10 million, because the layer is exhausted. This example illustrates why proportional and non-proportional treaties serve different purposes: the quota share shares the portfolio broadly, whereas excess of loss concentrates protection on severe events.

7. Programme design and comparative evaluation

A rigorous programme design process has several stages. First, define objectives: capital relief, earnings stability, catastrophe protection, liquidity, capacity, or protection of a captive. Second, map exposures by peril, geography, legal entity, policy terms and accumulation. Third, model frequency, severity, correlation and tail scenarios. Fourth, compare retention and transfer alternatives using total economic cost, not premium alone. Fifth, test contract certainty, collateral, counterparty credit and claims payment mechanics. Finally, monitor performance and revise the programme as exposures change.

MechanismMain risk transferredPrincipal strengthPrincipal limitation
Self-insuranceNone or limitedFlexibility and low transaction costCapital and volatility retained
ReserveFunding of expected obligationsBudgetary disciplineMay not provide cash or risk transfer
CaptiveDefined corporate or group risksControl, data and tailored retentionGovernance, capital and regulatory burden
Parametric coverEvent or index riskRapid, transparent settlementBasis risk
Catastrophe bondDefined catastrophe riskMulti-year capital-market capacityModel, trigger and transaction complexity
Quota shareProportional portfolio riskCapacity and balance-sheet reliefCedes good risks as well as bad
Surplus shareAmount above retained lineSelective proportional protectionAdministrative complexity
Occurrence excess of lossSevere individual eventsStrong catastrophe protectionNo response to dispersed attritional losses
Aggregate excess of lossAnnual accumulationEarnings stabilisationRequires reliable aggregate modelling

The cheapest quoted premium is not necessarily the best choice. A lower premium may reflect a higher attachment, narrower definition of occurrence, restrictive exclusions, weak reinstatement terms, unsecured counterparty exposure or significant basis risk. Programme optimisation should consider risk-adjusted return on capital, solvency capital relief, liquidity timing and stakeholder objectives.

8. Governance, regulation and ethics

Risk transfer creates governance obligations. Boards should understand retained exposures, model uncertainty, counterparty concentration and the circumstances in which protection may fail. Reinsurance purchasing should not be used to conceal weak underwriting or inadequate reserves. Related-party captive transactions require arm’s-length pricing and independent oversight.

Regulators typically examine licensing, capital adequacy, reserving, collateral, concentration, contract certainty, claims-paying resources and regulatory reporting. Solvency frameworks may recognise reinsurance credit only when the reinsurer is sufficiently secure or collateralised. Cross-border arrangements also involve sanctions, data protection, tax, currency and insolvency-law issues.

Ethical issues include fair treatment of policyholders, transparent disclosure of exclusions, responsible use of catastrophe models, avoidance of misleading parametric triggers and equitable allocation of scarce capacity. A structure that improves the sponsor’s balance sheet but leaves policyholders exposed to an opaque trigger may be financially efficient yet ethically deficient. Model governance should include validation, sensitivity analysis, documentation of assumptions and escalation of material uncertainty.

9. Technology and contemporary developments

Cloud platforms, satellite data, Internet of Things sensors and automated claims systems make parametric and embedded protection more feasible. Artificial intelligence can improve exposure classification, accumulation monitoring, claims triage and scenario generation. However, AI does not eliminate model risk. Biased data, unstable relationships, cyber compromise and poor explainability can produce inappropriate pricing or claims decisions.

Climate change is increasing uncertainty in catastrophe frequency, severity and correlation. Historical data may be a poor guide to future conditions, so forward-looking catastrophe models, stress testing and adaptation analysis are essential. Cyber risk is another area in which silent exposures, accumulation and attribution difficulties challenge traditional indemnity structures. Public-private pools and ILS may become more important where protection gaps exceed conventional market capacity.

Illustrative case: a regional power utility

Background

A fictional regional power utility operates substations and transmission assets across a coastal area. It faces windstorm, flood, equipment breakdown, business interruption and liability exposures. Historical losses are frequent but generally moderate; a severe storm could produce losses exceeding the utility’s annual operating surplus.

Problem

Commercial insurers offer occurrence catastrophe cover, but the proposed attachment is high and flood sublimits create a protection gap. The utility also needs immediate liquidity after a disaster because indemnity adjustment could take months. Management is considering a larger retention, a captive and parametric protection.

Analysis

The utility separates the risk into layers. Routine equipment losses are sufficiently predictable for a funded retention. Medium-sized losses are placed through a captive with reinsurance support. Severe windstorm losses are protected by occurrence excess of loss. A parametric layer is designed to provide rapid liquidity when an independently measured wind speed exceeds specified thresholds. Historical and simulated storms are used to compare the trigger with actual damage, quantify basis risk and test geographical placement of measurement stations.

Approach and solution

The utility establishes a regulated captive, subject to capital and governance requirements. It retains predictable losses up to a defined annual budget, purchases aggregate protection for accumulation, and buys catastrophe excess of loss above the captive’s event retention. A parametric contract provides emergency cash, while indemnity reinsurance addresses the ultimate repair cost. The programme includes independent data sources, a clear event definition, collateral and counterparty standards, annual exposure updates and board reporting.

Outcome

The structure does not eliminate loss, but it improves liquidity, separates predictable from catastrophic risk and reduces reliance on one market. The utility accepts that parametric payments may not equal damage and therefore does not treat the parametric layer as a complete substitute for indemnity cover.

Learning points

The case demonstrates the value of layered financing, the distinction between liquidity and indemnity protection, and the need to assess basis risk jointly with catastrophe modelling. It also shows that a captive is an operating financial institution requiring governance, not merely a premium-saving device.

Challenges and limitations

ART and reinsurance can fail through inadequate data, model error, ambiguous wording, insolvency, collateral disputes, basis risk, moral hazard and unexpected correlation. Retention may be underestimated when climate or litigation trends change. Captives may suffer concentration and insufficient diversification. Finite structures may obscure the economic nature of the transaction. Capital-market instruments may become difficult to issue during market stress. Operational resilience is essential because claims, trigger data and payments may depend on technology and external providers.

Best practice is therefore to maintain a documented risk-financing strategy; use independent actuarial and legal review; analyse gross, net and reinstated exposures; stress-test attachment and exhaustion points; reconcile contract wording with models; diversify counterparties; monitor collateral; and conduct post-event reviews. The programme should be integrated with underwriting, capital, liquidity, business continuity and enterprise risk management.

Chapter Summary

Alternative risk transfer expands risk-financing choices beyond conventional insurance. Retention and reserves can efficiently fund predictable losses but do not necessarily provide legal risk transfer or protection against ruin. Captives offer control and tailored risk bearing, while finite structures combine limited transfer with funding and timing features and require careful accounting and regulatory scrutiny. Parametric insurance provides rapid, transparent payments but creates basis risk. Catastrophe bonds and other ILS connect insurance exposures with capital-market investors and can provide diversified, multi-year capacity.

Reinsurance is either proportional or non-proportional. Quota share and surplus share divide premiums and losses, whereas occurrence excess of loss, aggregate excess of loss and stop-loss covers respond to losses above defined thresholds. A sound programme matches each layer to loss frequency, severity, liquidity needs and capital objectives. Effective design requires modelling, contract certainty, counterparty analysis, governance, ethical transparency and continuous monitoring.

Key Terms

Alternative risk transfer: Risk-financing arrangements that combine insurance, finance, derivatives or capital markets outside conventional insurance.

Aggregate excess of loss: Cover responding when cumulative losses exceed an annual attachment point.

Basis risk: The difference between the protection payment and the insured’s actual economic loss.

Captive insurer: An insurer established primarily to insure risks of its owner or associated group.

Catastrophe bond: An insurance-linked security whose principal may fund catastrophe losses after a defined trigger.

Collateralised reinsurance: Reinsurance supported by collateral placed for the benefit of the cedant.

Deductible: The amount of a loss borne by the insured before insurance payment.

Excess of loss: Non-proportional reinsurance responding above an attachment point, subject to a limit.

Facultative reinsurance: Reinsurance negotiated for an individual risk.

Finite risk: Structured risk transfer with limited underwriting risk and significant funding or timing elements.

Industry loss warranty: Protection triggered by an industry-wide loss index rather than the buyer’s exact loss.

Insurance-linked security: A security whose investor returns depend on insurance or catastrophe events.

Parametric insurance: Cover triggered by an objectively measured index or physical parameter.

Quota share: Proportional treaty sharing a fixed percentage of premiums and losses.

Reinsurance: Transfer of specified insurer risks to another risk-bearing entity.

Reserve: An accounting or financial provision for expected obligations.

Self-insured retention: The loss amount funded and often administered by the insured before insurer response.

Stop-loss treaty: Cover responding when losses or a loss ratio exceed an agreed threshold.

Surplus share: Proportional reinsurance covering the amount above the cedant’s retained lines.

Trigger: The contractual event or measurement that activates protection.

Review Questions

Short Answer Questions

  1. Why can two risks with the same expected loss require different risk-financing strategies?
  2. Distinguish a funded reserve from an unfunded reserve.
  3. What is basis risk in a parametric insurance contract?
  4. Differentiate facultative and treaty reinsurance.
  5. State one principal advantage and one limitation of a captive insurer.

Long Answer Questions

  1. Compare self-insurance, captives, finite risk and conventional insurance using cost, control, capital and governance criteria.
  2. Explain the operation of quota-share and surplus-share reinsurance and identify situations in which each may be appropriate.
  3. Discuss occurrence excess of loss, aggregate excess of loss and stop-loss protection.
  4. Evaluate catastrophe bonds as an alternative to traditional catastrophe reinsurance.
  5. Design a governance framework for an organisation using a captive and parametric insurance.

Analytical / Application Questions

  1. An insurer has a covered loss of 18 million and an occurrence cover of 6 million excess of 10 million. Calculate the reinsurer’s payment and the amount above the layer.
  2. A company is considering a parametric windstorm contract. Propose a method for measuring basis risk using historical and simulated events.
  3. Design a layered risk-financing programme for a multinational manufacturer with frequent small losses, occasional large losses and a remote catastrophe exposure. Justify the retention and transfer mechanisms selected.

Multiple Choice Questions with Answers

Question 1

Which mechanism primarily provides rapid payment based on an objective event measurement rather than verified physical loss?

A. Parametric insurance

B. Quota-share reinsurance

C. Loss portfolio transfer

D. Self-insurance

Correct Answer: A. Parametric insurance

Question 2

A quota-share treaty with q = 0.30 applies to a covered loss of 8 million monetary units. What is the ceded loss?

A. 2.4 million

B. 5.6 million

C. 8.3 million

D. 24 million

Correct Answer: A. 2.4 million

Question 3

A 5 million excess of 10 million occurrence cover responds to a covered loss of 13 million. What is the reinsurer’s payment?

A. 0 million

B. 3 million

C. 5 million

D. 13 million

Correct Answer: B. 3 million

Question 4

Which statement best describes a captive insurer?

A. An insurer established primarily for its owner or associated group

B. A public catastrophe bond traded only by governments

C. A deductible applied to every commercial policy

D. A compulsory state reserve with no underwriting function

Correct Answer: A. An insurer established primarily for its owner or associated group

Question 5

What is the principal disadvantage of a parametric insurance contract?

A. It always requires lengthy claims adjustment

B. It cannot use objective data

C. Its payment may not match the insured’s actual loss

D. It can never provide catastrophe protection

Correct Answer: C. Its payment may not match the insured’s actual loss

Question 6

Which reinsurance form shares a fixed percentage of premiums and losses on covered business?

A. Quota share

B. Aggregate excess of loss

C. Stop loss

D. Facultative excess of loss only

Correct Answer: A. Quota share

Question 7

An aggregate excess-of-loss treaty generally responds when:

A. A single policy is issued

B. Cumulative losses during the period exceed an attachment

C. The reinsurer receives a fixed commission

D. Every loss is divided in the same percentage

Correct Answer: B. Cumulative losses during the period exceed an attachment

Question 8

What is a major function of catastrophe bonds?

A. To transfer defined catastrophe risk to capital-market investors

B. To eliminate all basis risk from parametric insurance

C. To replace every form of statutory reserve

D. To guarantee that no catastrophe loss occurs

Correct Answer: A. To transfer defined catastrophe risk to capital-market investors

Question 9

Why may a reserve fail to provide complete risk protection?

A. A reserve cannot be recorded in accounts

B. An unfunded reserve may recognise an obligation without creating cash or risk transfer

C. A reserve always transfers risk to a reinsurer

D. A reserve applies only to catastrophe bonds

Correct Answer: B. An unfunded reserve may recognise an obligation without creating cash or risk transfer

Question 10

Which feature most directly distinguishes surplus-share from quota-share reinsurance?

A. Surplus share selectively covers amounts above the cedant’s retained lines

B. Surplus share never involves premiums

C. Quota share responds only to aggregate catastrophe losses

D. Quota share is legally identical to self-insurance

Correct Answer: A. Surplus share selectively covers amounts above the cedant’s retained lines

Principles of Risk Management
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