Cooperative Banking and Rural Credit Institutions

Introduction and Context

Agriculture in India has historically faced a structural mismatch between the timing of expenditure and the timing of income. Farmers purchase seeds, fertilisers, livestock, machinery and labour before crops are sold. Small and marginal farmers often lack marketable collateral and have irregular cash flows. These conditions create a demand for affordable, accessible and appropriately timed credit.

Before the expansion of institutional finance, rural borrowers depended heavily on moneylenders, traders, landlords and relatives. Informal lenders were often geographically accessible, but interest rates, repayment practices and loan conditions could be exploitative. Rural credit policy therefore sought to achieve three related objectives: reduce dependence on informal credit, provide productive credit for agriculture and promote rural development through locally accountable institutions.

India’s rural financial architecture developed through several stages. Cooperative credit societies introduced member-owned institutions; land development banks supplied longer-term finance; Regional Rural Banks attempted to combine local knowledge with banking discipline; and the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD) became the apex institution for rural credit planning, refinancing, supervision and development.

These institutions have made important contributions, but their performance has been uneven. Weak governance, political interference, poor recovery, inadequate technology, overlapping jurisdictions and regional disparities have limited their effectiveness. Understanding both their achievements and their limitations is essential for evaluating Indian banking and finance history.

Learning Objectives

After completing this chapter, a learner should be able to:

1. Explain the origin, structure and functions of cooperative credit societies.
2. Distinguish short- and medium-term cooperative credit from long-term land development finance.
3. Describe the structure, role and performance of Regional Rural Banks.
4. Explain the establishment and functions of NABARD.
5. Evaluate governance, regulatory and financial challenges in rural credit institutions.
6. Apply rural-credit concepts to an agricultural financing situation.

1. The Cooperative Credit Movement

Historical origins

The Cooperative Credit Societies Act, 1904 marked the beginning of the organised cooperative credit movement in British India. It was influenced by European cooperative ideas, particularly the principle that individuals with common economic interests could voluntarily pool resources and provide mutual assistance. The Act primarily encouraged rural credit societies, although its scope and institutional capacity were limited.

The Cooperative Societies Act, 1912 broadened the framework. It permitted the formation of central and non-credit cooperatives and facilitated the development of federated structures. After the establishment of provincial autonomy, cooperative legislation increasingly became a state subject. Consequently, the legal framework, registration procedures, supervision and administrative practices of cooperatives developed differently across states.

The All-India Rural Credit Survey Committee, whose report was published in 1954, was a major turning point. It concluded that cooperatives should become the principal institutional channel for rural credit, but also emphasised the need for state partnership, adequate resources, professional management and integration of credit with marketing and agricultural services. Its well-known policy orientation was that cooperation must be supported by state participation, not merely by official regulation.

Meaning and principles

A cooperative credit society is a member-owned financial institution formed to mobilise savings and provide credit to members on mutually agreed terms. Unlike a conventional commercial bank, its primary purpose is not profit maximisation for external shareholders. It is intended to serve members through democratic participation and mutual assistance.

Important cooperative principles include:

• voluntary and open membership;
• democratic control, generally expressed as one member, one vote;
• member participation in capital formation;
• service orientation rather than exclusive profit maximisation;
• limited returns on share capital in many cooperative models;
• distribution of surplus according to legal rules and member benefit; and
• concern for the wider community.

In practice, however, the actual operation of a cooperative may differ from its formal principles. A society may be legally member-owned but effectively controlled by a small group, local political leaders or government officials. Thus, cooperative ownership must be assessed together with participation, transparency and accountability.

2. Structure of the Cooperative Credit System

The traditional rural cooperative credit structure has three levels:

1. Primary Agricultural Credit Societies (PACS) at the village or grassroots level.
2. Central Cooperative Banks (CCBs) generally operating at the district level.
3. State Cooperative Banks (StCBs) operating at the state or apex level.

The structure is often described as a three-tier short- and medium-term cooperative credit system. Its precise form varies among states, and some states use a two-tier structure by combining functions of central and state institutions.

Primary Agricultural Credit Societies

PACS are the lowest and most locally oriented units. Their members are usually farmers, agricultural labourers, rural artisans and other persons connected with the local economy. They accept member deposits in some jurisdictions, borrow from higher-level cooperative institutions and lend to members.

Their functions commonly include:

• providing crop loans and short-term production credit;
• supplying seeds, fertilisers and other agricultural inputs;
• facilitating repayment and recovery at the village level;
• arranging marketing or storage services in selected areas;
• implementing government-supported credit or subsidy programmes; and
• promoting thrift and collective economic activity.

PACS have the advantage of proximity. Local staff and members may understand cropping patterns, land use and borrower behaviour better than a distant institution. This reduces information gaps. However, local familiarity can also generate favouritism, social pressure and inadequate documentation.

Central Cooperative Banks

CCBs link PACS with the state cooperative banking system. They mobilise deposits, obtain funds from the State Cooperative Bank or other sources, lend to PACS and sometimes lend directly to individuals, cooperatives and rural enterprises. They also supervise, audit or support affiliated PACS, depending on state arrangements.

The CCB is therefore both a financial intermediary and a coordinating institution. Its performance depends heavily on the quality of its affiliated societies. If PACS submit unreliable accounts or recover loans poorly, the CCB’s financial position is affected.

State Cooperative Banks

The StCB is the apex institution in the short-term cooperative credit structure. It mobilises deposits, raises funds from financial institutions, channels refinance and allocates resources to CCBs. It may also coordinate cooperative banking policy within the state and act as an intermediary between the cooperative sector and national institutions.

The cooperative structure can be represented as follows:

Figure: The conventional three-tier structure of short- and medium-term cooperative credit.

Strengths and limitations

Cooperatives possess four important strengths. They are locally embedded, can use member knowledge, can reduce transaction costs and can connect credit with agricultural inputs and marketing. They also have potential to promote financial inclusion in places where commercial banks may have limited branch presence.

Their limitations are equally significant. Many societies have a narrow membership base, weak capital, poor bookkeeping, delayed audits and limited professional staff. Political influence may affect loan selection, interest concessions and recovery. In some cases, borrowers regard loans as government transfers, particularly where repeated loan waivers have weakened repayment culture. Dormant or nominal members can make the institution appear larger than its active economic base.

A cooperative’s financial sustainability depends on the relationship between income, operating cost and loan losses. A simple operating surplus relationship is:

This is a simplified management identity, not a complete statutory profit-and-loss formula. Interest income and expense must be measured for the same accounting period, while loan-loss provisions represent expected or recognised credit losses. A society can have high lending volume but still be financially weak if recovery is poor and provisions are inadequate.

3. Land Development Banks and Long-Term Rural Credit

Short-term crop finance cannot adequately fund investments whose benefits occur over many years. Examples include wells, irrigation systems, tractors, land improvement, orchards, dairy units, storage facilities and rural housing. These require long-term loans with repayment schedules matched to the expected economic life and cash flow of the asset.

Land development banks were created to meet this need. They were historically known as land mortgage banks because loans were secured by mortgages over agricultural land. Their principal function was to provide medium- and long-term finance for agricultural development and land improvement.

Structure and functions

The long-term cooperative credit system commonly included:

• Primary Cooperative Agriculture and Rural Development Banks (PCARDBs) or similar primary-level institutions; and
• State Cooperative Agriculture and Rural Development Banks (SCARDBs) at the state or apex level.

The exact institutional structure differs between states. Some systems have a direct relationship between the state-level institution and borrowers, while others operate through primary-level banks.

Land development banks raised funds through deposits where permitted, debentures, borrowings and refinance arrangements. Loans were generally secured, with repayment spread over several years. Their activities included financing:

• land improvement and reclamation;
• irrigation and wells;
• farm mechanisation;
• purchase of land in approved circumstances;
• horticulture and plantation development;
• rural industries and allied agricultural activities; and
• conversion or consolidation of certain agricultural debts.

Distinction from short-term cooperative credit

Problems of land development banks

Long-term rural lending involves significant valuation, documentation and recovery challenges. Land records may be incomplete or disputed. Agricultural land cannot always be sold easily, and enforcement of security may be socially and legally difficult. Loan funds may be diverted from the approved investment. In addition, long-term institutions can face asset-liability mismatches if they finance long-duration loans with short-term funds.

Their relevance remains substantial, but modern rural finance increasingly combines term lending with credit guarantees, crop insurance, warehouse finance, joint liability arrangements and digital land records. The central principle remains unchanged: loan maturity should reflect the productive life and cash flow of the financed asset.

4. Regional Rural Banks

Origin and rationale

Regional Rural Banks (RRBs) were established in 1975 following the recommendations of the Working Group on Rural Banks chaired by M. Narasimham. The first RRBs were established in October 1975. The Regional Rural Banks Act, 1976 provided the statutory basis for their operation.

RRBs were designed to fill a perceived institutional gap. Commercial banks had expanded into rural areas after bank nationalisation, but they were sometimes viewed as insufficiently familiar with local conditions. Cooperatives had local access but often suffered from weak management and limited resources. RRBs were intended to combine the local orientation of cooperatives with the managerial standards and banking practices of commercial banks.

Ownership and governance

The ownership pattern traditionally involved:

• the Central Government;
• the concerned State Government; and
• a sponsoring commercial bank.

The conventional shareholding pattern was 50 per cent Central Government, 15 per cent State Government and 35 per cent sponsoring bank. Subsequent reforms and recapitalisation arrangements have modified the practical context, but this pattern explains the original institutional design.

The sponsoring bank supported establishment, training, management and technical systems. RRBs were expected to operate within a defined regional area and focus on small and marginal farmers, agricultural labourers, artisans, small entrepreneurs and other economically weaker sections.

Functions

RRBs perform ordinary banking functions—accepting deposits, granting loans, remitting funds and providing payment services—but with a rural-development orientation. Their lending has included:

• crop loans;
• investment credit for agriculture and allied activities;
• loans to rural artisans and micro-enterprises;
• self-help groups and joint liability groups;
• small businesses and rural services; and
• government-supported financial inclusion programmes.

RRBs contributed to branch expansion and helped bring formal banking to underserved districts. They have also supported the development of savings habits, direct benefit transfers and institutional credit access.

Performance and consolidation

RRBs initially faced high transaction costs, limited business volume, weak capital and difficulties in recovering loans. Their restricted geographic areas reduced diversification. Many had low profitability and high non-performing assets. At the same time, they performed a social and developmental function that could not be judged only by commercial banking indicators.

Reforms focused on recapitalisation, improved governance, computerisation, prudential norms, sponsor-bank support and amalgamation. Consolidation reduced the number of RRBs and created larger entities with wider operational capacity. However, consolidation alone does not guarantee success. A larger RRB still requires sound credit appraisal, local accountability, skilled staff and a clear balance between social obligations and financial sustainability.

5. NABARD: Apex Institution for Agriculture and Rural Development

Establishment

The National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD) was established on 12 July 1982 under the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development Act, 1981. It was created as an apex development financial institution for agriculture and rural development. Its establishment followed the recognition that rural finance required not merely bank branches, but coordinated planning, refinance, supervision, institution building and development interventions.

NABARD took over important functions relating to agricultural credit that had earlier been associated with the Reserve Bank of India. The Reserve Bank, however, continued to have important monetary and banking-regulatory responsibilities, while NABARD became the specialised apex institution for rural credit and development.

Major functions

NABARD’s functions include:

1. Refinance: It provides refinance to eligible financial institutions for agricultural and rural development lending. Refinance allows a lending institution to obtain funds after extending eligible loans, subject to terms and conditions.
2. Credit planning: It supports district-level and state-level credit planning and assesses rural credit requirements.
3. Supervision: It has supervisory responsibilities over Regional Rural Banks and cooperative banks within the statutory and regulatory framework.
4. Institution building: It supports training, capacity development, improved accounting, computerisation and governance reforms in rural financial institutions.
5. Development programmes: It promotes rural infrastructure, self-help groups, financial inclusion, producer organisations and livelihood initiatives.
6. Policy support: It provides research, monitoring and policy inputs concerning agriculture and rural finance.
7. Rural infrastructure finance: It has supported infrastructure financing through specialised funds and programmes, including assistance for roads, irrigation, warehousing and other rural assets.

Refinance mechanism

Suppose a cooperative bank grants an eligible agricultural investment loan. Rather than relying entirely on its own deposits, it may obtain refinance from NABARD subject to eligibility, documentation, interest and repayment conditions. The mechanism improves liquidity and encourages lending to priority rural activities. Refinance is not a substitute for credit appraisal: the primary lending institution remains responsible for selecting borrowers, monitoring use of funds and recovering loans.

NABARD’s role is therefore broader than that of a conventional lender. It operates through a combination of finance, supervision, coordination and institutional development. Its developmental contribution is particularly important where rural institutions lack technical expertise or financial capacity.

6. Governance and Regulatory Challenges

Democratic ownership versus professional management

Cooperatives are expected to be democratic, but financial institutions require specialised skills in credit appraisal, risk management, accounting, compliance and technology. Excessive political control can weaken professional decision-making, while excessive bureaucratic control can undermine member ownership. Effective governance requires a clear division: members should determine broad direction through accountable institutions, while qualified managers should conduct operations under transparent oversight.

Political interference and loan waivers

Loan waivers may provide immediate relief after severe agricultural distress, but repeated or poorly designed waivers can create moral hazard. Borrowers may delay repayment in anticipation of future relief, while institutions may become reluctant to lend. Waivers can also benefit better-connected borrowers more than the poorest households. Relief policy should therefore be transparent, fiscally supported and distinguished from routine credit discipline.

Recovery and asset quality

A loan becomes problematic when instalments or interest remain overdue beyond the regulatory classification period. Non-performing assets reduce income, consume capital and weaken the ability to lend. A useful management measure is the gross non-performing asset ratio:

The numerator and denominator must be measured on a consistent reporting date and according to applicable regulatory definitions. The ratio indicates asset-quality stress, but it does not by itself show profitability, provisioning adequacy or social impact.

Recovery should not be pursued through coercive or discriminatory practices. Institutions should use responsible restructuring where genuine temporary distress exists, while preventing wilful default and diversion of funds.

Dual and overlapping regulation

Rural cooperative institutions may be influenced by state cooperative departments, the Reserve Bank of India, NABARD, registrars of cooperative societies and other authorities. The division of responsibilities has sometimes produced regulatory gaps or inconsistent accountability. Clear prudential regulation, timely audit, fit-and-proper management, depositor protection and reliable reporting are necessary for confidence.

Financial inclusion and exclusion

Opening an account does not ensure meaningful inclusion. A rural customer needs affordable credit, reliable payments, savings products, insurance, financial literacy and grievance redressal. Digital systems can reduce costs, but poor connectivity, lack of digital skills, biometric failures and cyber fraud may exclude vulnerable customers. Technology should therefore supplement, not automatically replace, accessible human support.

Ethical governance

Rural financial institutions handle public deposits and often lend to vulnerable communities. Ethical practice requires:

• transparent disclosure of interest, fees and penalties;
• prevention of conflicts of interest;
• non-discriminatory access to services;
• protection of customer data;
• fair recovery practices;
• accurate accounts and timely audits; and
• mechanisms for complaints and whistle-blowing.

7. Applied Case: Financing a Small Irrigation Project

This is an illustrative case.

Background

A group of 28 small farmers in a semi-arid district cultivates two seasonal crops. Their yields are unstable because rainfall is uncertain. The group proposes a community borewell, drip-irrigation system and water-storage tank. The investment is expected to improve yields over several years rather than within one crop season.

Problem

A PACS can provide seasonal crop loans, but the proposed project requires a five-year investment loan. Individual farmers have limited collateral, incomplete records and insufficient savings. A moneylender offers quick finance at a high effective cost, but repayment would be difficult during poor harvests.

Analysis

The project is not simply a crop-credit requirement. It is a long-term rural asset requiring technical appraisal, water feasibility assessment, maintenance planning and a repayment schedule linked to increased farm income. A land development bank or an eligible commercial/RRB channel could finance the asset, while the PACS could continue to provide seasonal working capital.

The farmers may form or strengthen a legally recognised group, contribute part of the project cost, maintain records of water use and establish a maintenance fund. NABARD-supported institutional or infrastructure programmes may assist the lending institution, depending on eligibility. Crop insurance and water-saving technology can reduce risk but cannot replace proper appraisal.

Approach and solution

1. The group prepares a project report covering cost, expected yield, water availability and repayment capacity.
2. The local cooperative or RRB verifies land, membership, technical feasibility and projected cash flows.
3. Long-term finance is sanctioned with instalments matched to the asset’s productive life.
4. PACS provides seasonal crop finance and input support.
5. Repayment is monitored collectively, but each borrower’s liability is clearly recorded.
6. A maintenance and contingency reserve is established.
7. NABARD or another apex channel may provide refinance or development support to the eligible institution.

Outcome

If the project is technically viable and properly maintained, irrigation reduces production uncertainty, raises household income and improves repayment capacity. The institutional arrangement also demonstrates why different rural credit institutions are complementary: long-term finance funds the asset, short-term credit supports cultivation, the RRB or cooperative provides banking access, and NABARD supports the wider system.

Learning points

• Loan maturity should match the economic life of the financed asset.
• Local institutions can reduce information problems but need professional appraisal.
• Refinance supports liquidity but does not eliminate credit risk.
• Rural development requires coordinated credit, infrastructure, technology and extension services.
• Group-based finance is effective only when responsibilities, records and governance are clear.

8. Contemporary Directions and Best Practices

Rural credit institutions are being reshaped by core banking, mobile payments, Aadhaar-enabled services, direct benefit transfers, digital credit records, geospatial information and electronic land records. Artificial intelligence may assist in crop-risk assessment or early-warning systems, but automated models can reproduce exclusion if data are incomplete or biased. Human review, consent, data protection and explainability remain essential.

Important best practices include:

• strengthen PACS accounting, audit and member participation;
• use standardised but locally appropriate credit appraisal;
• improve land and borrower records;
• link lending with crop insurance, extension and market access;
• monitor end use without imposing excessive paperwork;
• distinguish genuine distress from wilful default;
• improve board training and fit-and-proper standards;
• use technology with assisted service points;
• publish understandable financial and governance information; and
• measure both financial sustainability and developmental outcomes.

The future of rural banking should not be framed as a choice between cooperatives, RRBs and commercial banks. A resilient system requires all of them to perform clearly defined and coordinated functions. Cooperatives bring member participation and local knowledge; RRBs provide a regional banking platform; land development institutions support long-term assets; and NABARD provides system-level finance and development support.

Chapter Summary

India’s rural credit system evolved from informal finance toward a network of cooperative societies, land development banks, Regional Rural Banks and NABARD. Cooperative credit societies are member-owned institutions organised around mutual assistance and democratic control. Their conventional structure consists of PACS at village level, CCBs at district level and StCBs at state level. They provide local access to crop credit, inputs and related services, but face challenges involving weak capital, poor recovery, political interference and inadequate professional management.

Land development banks provide medium- and long-term finance for irrigation, land improvement, mechanisation and other productive assets. Their success depends on reliable land records, proper technical appraisal and repayment schedules matched to long-term cash flows. RRBs, established from 1975 under the 1976 Act, were designed to combine the local orientation of cooperatives with the banking expertise of commercial banks. They have expanded formal rural banking but have faced profitability, capital and asset-quality pressures.

NABARD, established in 1982, is the apex institution for agricultural and rural development finance. Its functions include refinance, credit planning, supervision, institution building, rural infrastructure support and policy development. The effectiveness of the rural credit system depends not only on the volume of loans but also on governance, responsible recovery, inclusion, transparency, technology and coordination among institutions.

Key Terms

Cooperative credit society: A member-owned institution formed to mobilise savings and provide credit to members.

PACS: Primary Agricultural Credit Society operating mainly at the village or grassroots level.

Central Cooperative Bank: District-level cooperative bank linking PACS with the state cooperative bank.

State Cooperative Bank: Apex institution in the short-term cooperative credit structure of a state.

One member, one vote: Democratic cooperative principle under which voting power is generally not proportional to share capital.

Land development bank: Institution providing medium- and long-term finance for agricultural investment and land improvement.

Mortgage: A security interest in property created to secure repayment of a loan.

RRB: Regional Rural Bank established to provide banking and credit services in a defined rural region.

Sponsoring bank: Commercial bank that supports an RRB through management, training and technical assistance.

NABARD: National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development, the apex development institution for agriculture and rural finance.

Refinance: Funds provided to an eligible lending institution against or in support of eligible loans already extended or to be extended.

Rural credit planning: Systematic assessment and allocation of credit requirements for rural and agricultural activities.

Non-performing asset: A loan asset that fails to generate income according to applicable prudential norms.

Loan recovery: Collection of principal and interest due from borrowers.

Asset-liability mismatch: A situation in which the maturity or cash-flow pattern of assets differs materially from that of liabilities.

Financial inclusion: Affordable and effective access to useful financial services for individuals and enterprises.

Moral hazard: Increased risk-taking or reduced repayment effort because a borrower expects protection from the consequences.

Governance: Structures and processes through which an institution is directed, monitored and held accountable.

Joint liability group: A group arrangement in which members share responsibility for repayment under specified lending conditions.

Priority sector lending: Regulatory framework directing credit toward sectors considered important for inclusive development.

Review Questions

Short Answer Questions

1. What were the principal objectives of the cooperative credit movement in India?
2. Distinguish PACS from Central Cooperative Banks.
3. Why are land development banks needed in addition to crop-credit institutions?
4. State the original ownership pattern of Regional Rural Banks.
5. Identify four major functions of NABARD.

Long Answer Questions

1. Explain the structure, principles, functions and limitations of the cooperative credit system.
2. Discuss the origin, objectives, ownership and performance of Regional Rural Banks.
3. Examine the role of NABARD in refinance, supervision, credit planning and rural development.
4. Compare short-term cooperative credit institutions with land development banks.
5. Analyse the major governance and regulatory challenges confronting rural credit institutions.

Analytical / Application Questions

1. A PACS has strong local relationships but weak accounting, delayed audits and rising overdue loans. Design a governance and recovery improvement plan without destroying member participation.
2. A farmer seeks a seven-year loan for irrigation equipment but requests the entire amount as a seasonal crop loan. Which institution and loan structure would be more appropriate, and why?
3. Evaluate whether amalgamation of several RRBs necessarily improves rural financial inclusion. Identify possible benefits, risks and performance indicators.

Multiple Choice Questions with Answers

Question 1

Which institution operates primarily at the village level in the conventional cooperative credit structure?

A. State Cooperative Bank

B. Central Cooperative Bank

C. Primary Agricultural Credit Society

D. NABARD

Correct Answer: C. Primary Agricultural Credit Society

Question 2

The principal purpose of a land development bank is to provide finance for:

A. Only daily household consumption

B. Long-term agricultural and land improvement investments

C. Foreign exchange transactions

D. Government salary payments

Correct Answer: B. Long-term agricultural and land improvement investments

Question 3

Regional Rural Banks were originally designed to combine the local orientation of cooperatives with the banking expertise of:

A. Insurance companies

B. Commercial banks

C. Stock exchanges

D. Moneylenders

Correct Answer: B. Commercial banks

Question 4

NABARD was established in:

A. 1954

B. 1969

C. 1975

D. 1982

Correct Answer: D. 1982

Question 5

Which is a major function of NABARD?

A. Issuing company shares to the public

B. Providing refinance and supporting rural credit institutions

C. Fixing retail prices of agricultural commodities

D. Managing urban stock exchanges

Correct Answer: B. Providing refinance and supporting rural credit institutions

Question 6

The principle ‘one member, one vote’ refers primarily to:

A. Proportional voting based on loan size

B. Democratic control in cooperatives

C. Voting only by government officials

D. Voting based on land area

Correct Answer: B. Democratic control in cooperatives

Question 7

If gross non-performing assets are ₹8 crore and gross advances are ₹200 crore, the gross NPA ratio is:

A. 2%

B. 4%

C. 8%

D. 25%

Correct Answer: B. 4%

Question 8

A five-year loan for a community irrigation system is best classified as:

A. Long-term investment credit

B. Overnight money-market finance

C. A remittance service

D. A deposit product

Correct Answer: A. Long-term investment credit

Question 9

Which problem can result from repeated poorly designed loan waivers?

A. Improved repayment incentives in every case

B. Moral hazard and weakened credit discipline

C. Automatic improvement in accounting

D. Elimination of all agricultural risk

Correct Answer: B. Moral hazard and weakened credit discipline

Question 10

Why is refinance not a substitute for credit appraisal by the primary lending institution?

A. Refinance eliminates the borrower’s obligation

B. The primary lender remains responsible for borrower selection, monitoring and recovery

C. Refinance is available only for urban housing

D. NABARD collects every loan directly from farmers

Correct Answer: B. The primary lender remains responsible for borrower selection, monitoring and recovery