States, Institutions and Non-State Actors

Introduction

Geopolitical risk is produced not only by governments. It emerges from interactions among states, international institutions, regional organizations, multinational enterprises (MNEs), civil-society organizations, armed groups, diasporas, technology companies and digitally networked communities. These actors possess different forms of authority, resources, legitimacy and coercive capacity. Their interests may converge temporarily, but they may also compete, cooperate or exploit one another.

For international businesses, this plural structure matters because political outcomes are rarely determined by a single ministry or national leader. A sanctions regime may be designed by governments, interpreted through international institutions, implemented by banks, challenged by NGOs, evaded by armed networks and amplified by online platforms. A port concession may depend simultaneously on a host government, a regional development bank, local communities, foreign investors and security actors. Geopolitical risk assessment therefore requires an actor-centred approach: identify who can influence an outcome, through which mechanisms, with what interests and under what constraints.

This chapter develops that approach. It distinguishes authority from power, examines the roles of major actor groups, introduces analytical frameworks for mapping influence and interdependence, and applies them to an illustrative case concerning critical infrastructure and digital technology.

Learning Objectives

By the end of this chapter, readers should be able to:

1. Distinguish states, institutions and non-state actors by their sources of authority and instruments of influence.
2. Explain how governments, international institutions and regional blocs shape geopolitical risk.
3. Assess the commercial and political roles of MNEs, NGOs, armed groups, diasporas and technology platforms.
4. Map actor interests, capabilities, dependencies and escalation pathways.
5. Integrate actor analysis into country risk, project due diligence and strategic decision-making.
6. Evaluate ethical, legal and governance challenges associated with engaging powerful non-state actors.

1. The Actor-Centred View of Geopolitical Risk

1.1 Authority, power and influence

Authority is the recognized right to make decisions or issue rules. A government generally has legal authority over taxation, licensing and border control. An international organization may have authority delegated by member states. A technology platform may have no formal sovereign authority but exercise substantial influence by controlling visibility, access to information and communication infrastructure.

Power is the capacity to produce an outcome, whether or not the actor possesses formal authority. Influence is the observable effect of an actor on the preferences or behaviour of others. These concepts should not be treated as interchangeable. A small state may possess legal authority but limited administrative capacity. A financial institution may lack coercive power but shape policy through lending conditions. An armed group may lack legitimacy but control territory and transportation routes.

A useful assessment asks five questions:

• What does the actor want?
• What resources can it mobilize?
• Over which people, assets or decisions does it have access?
• What constraints limit its behaviour?
• How might its actions alter the risk faced by the organization?

1.2 Types of power

Actors commonly exercise several forms of power:

Most important geopolitical outcomes involve combinations of these forms. For example, a regional bloc may use regulatory power to support economic sanctions; an NGO may use normative and informational power to trigger investor pressure; and an MNE may use economic and network power to negotiate exemptions or influence standards.

1.3 From actor lists to systems

A simple list of actors is insufficient. Risk depends on relationships among actors. The relevant system may include:

• principals, such as elected governments or shareholders;
• agents, such as regulators, contractors or implementing agencies;
• gatekeepers, such as customs authorities, payment processors or platform administrators;
• veto players, whose opposition can block a decision;
• brokers, who connect otherwise separate networks;
• spoilers, who benefit from preventing settlement or cooperation; and
• affected communities, whose acceptance or resistance influences legitimacy and continuity.

Actor mapping should therefore identify not only who is present, but who can alter the probability, timing and severity of an event.

2. States and Governments

2.1 The continuing centrality of the state

States remain the primary holders of sovereign authority. They define property rights, control borders, issue licences, regulate labour and environmental standards, collect taxes and provide security. They also represent national interests in diplomacy and international law. Even in highly globalized sectors, firms ultimately depend on state decisions concerning market access, physical security and legal enforceability.

The state should not be treated as a unified actor. Executive leaders, legislatures, courts, ministries, security services, local governments and state-owned enterprises may pursue different objectives. Political parties, bureaucratic agencies and military institutions can possess distinct preferences. A change in government may therefore alter policy, while a change in minister may not.

2.2 State capacity and legitimacy

State capacity is the ability to formulate and implement policy. It includes administrative competence, fiscal resources, control over territory, judicial effectiveness and the ability to deliver public services. Legitimacy concerns whether authority is accepted as rightful. High capacity without legitimacy may produce efficient but contested rule; legitimacy without capacity may produce accepted policies that are poorly implemented.

For business, capacity and legitimacy generate different risks. Weak capacity can cause unpredictable licensing, corruption, delays and inconsistent enforcement. Weak legitimacy can produce protests, strikes, electoral reversals or challenges from opposition groups. A government may sign a contract that it cannot enforce or that a successor government rejects.

2.3 Domestic political institutions

Geopolitical assessment should examine:

• executive–legislative relations;
• judicial independence and contract enforcement;
• civil–military relations;
• decentralization and the powers of subnational authorities;
• electoral competitiveness and succession rules;
• corruption and patronage networks; and
• the role of state-owned enterprises.

Institutions affect time horizons. An executive with a short electoral horizon may prioritize visible projects over long-term resilience. A legislature may delay an agreement. Courts may invalidate a concession. Local authorities may control land access even where the national government controls foreign investment approval.

2.4 State-owned enterprises and sovereign economic actors

State-owned enterprises combine commercial and political objectives. They may receive preferential finance, diplomatic protection or privileged access to strategic assets. Their investments can therefore be interpreted as instruments of national strategy rather than ordinary commercial transactions. MNEs competing with them must assess both market competition and geopolitical alignment.

Sovereign wealth funds, development banks and state-backed contractors are also important. Their capital can support infrastructure and market entry, but financing may create dependence, debt exposure or political expectations. The relevant question is not whether state involvement is inherently harmful; it is whether governance, transparency and contractual safeguards are adequate.

3. International Institutions and Regional Blocs

3.1 International institutions

International institutions include formal organizations, treaty regimes, courts, development banks and standard-setting bodies. Their influence comes from rules, funding, expertise, coordination and legitimacy. Examples include the United Nations system, the World Trade Organization, international financial institutions, treaty-based courts and specialized agencies.

Their effects on geopolitical risk include:

• establishing common rules and reporting requirements;
• providing dispute-resolution mechanisms;
• coordinating sanctions, peacekeeping or humanitarian responses;
• financing infrastructure and reform programmes;
• producing data and technical standards; and
• creating forums for negotiation and signalling.

International institutions are not fully independent of states. Their mandates, budgets and voting structures reflect member-state preferences. Nevertheless, bureaucratic expertise, legal procedures and institutional reputation can give them a degree of autonomy.

3.2 Regional blocs

Regional organizations deepen cooperation among geographically connected states. They may create common markets, customs unions, monetary arrangements, security mechanisms or regulatory systems. Regional integration can reduce transaction costs, but it can also transmit shocks across member states.

For firms, regional blocs create both opportunities and risks:

A firm should distinguish de jure integration—rules written in treaties—from de facto integration—the actual movement of goods, people, capital and data. Informal barriers, weak customs administration or political disputes may prevent formal commitments from producing practical access.

3.3 Institutional fragmentation and forum shopping

States and firms may choose among overlapping institutions, a process sometimes called forum shopping. A dispute may be taken to a national court, an arbitral tribunal, a regional court or a diplomatic forum. Overlapping rules can create protection, but they can also generate conflicting obligations and uncertainty.

Institutional fragmentation is especially important in digital regulation, investment screening, sanctions and environmental governance. A company may be legally permitted to operate in one jurisdiction while its financing, technology transfer or supply chain violates rules in another. Compliance must therefore be assessed across the full value chain rather than only at the point of incorporation.

4. Multinational Enterprises

4.1 MNEs as political and economic actors

MNEs are not merely passive recipients of geopolitical risk. Their investment decisions, employment practices, supply chains, tax arrangements and technology transfers can influence national development and foreign policy. Large firms may possess resources exceeding those of smaller states, but they usually lack sovereign authority and remain dependent on host and home governments.

MNE political influence can arise through:

• investment and employment;
• control of critical infrastructure or technology;
• lobbying and policy advocacy;
• standards and supply-chain requirements;
• expertise that governments do not possess; and
• the ability to relocate or suspend operations.

Influence creates responsibility. A firm that operates a communications network, port, energy facility or cloud service may become part of national security architecture. Its commercial decisions can have consequences beyond shareholders.

4.2 Home-state and host-state tensions

MNEs operate within a dual political environment. The host state seeks investment, jobs, taxes and technology. The home state may seek strategic advantage, market access or compliance with foreign-policy measures. Conflicts arise when the host state requests activity that the home state prohibits, or when the firm’s commercial interests conflict with national-security restrictions.

Managers should identify:

• applicable sanctions and export controls;
• investment-screening rules;
• beneficial ownership and politically exposed persons;
• local-content and technology-transfer obligations;
• data localization requirements; and
• the possibility of expropriation, forced divestment or informal state pressure.

4.3 Corporate political risk management

Effective MNE practice combines legal compliance with political intelligence. It includes stakeholder engagement, scenario planning, contractual protection, supply-chain diversification, crisis communication and clear escalation procedures. Political risk insurance and arbitration clauses may reduce financial exposure, but they cannot guarantee physical security or reputational acceptance.

A central principle is to avoid confusing government approval with social licence to operate. Communities, employees, civil society and local authorities may still resist a project that is legally authorized.

5. NGOs and Civil Society

Non-governmental organizations include humanitarian agencies, advocacy groups, professional associations, research institutions and community organizations. Their capabilities vary widely. Some possess global expertise and strong reputations; others are locally embedded and have superior knowledge of community dynamics.

NGOs influence geopolitical risk through:

• monitoring and documenting abuses;
• litigation and strategic complaints;
• public campaigns and investor engagement;
• humanitarian service delivery;
• environmental and social impact assessment; and
• convening affected communities.

Their reports can alter financing decisions, trigger regulatory scrutiny or damage corporate reputation. At the same time, NGOs are not automatically neutral. They have missions, funding structures, political commitments and methodological limitations. Analysts should evaluate evidence quality, funding transparency, local representation and the distinction between allegation and verified finding.

Engagement should be substantive rather than merely reputational. Consultation that does not affect project design can intensify distrust. Ethical engagement requires informed participation, protection of vulnerable groups and mechanisms for remedy.

6. Armed Groups, Criminal Networks and De Facto Authorities

Armed groups range from insurgencies and militias to terrorist organizations and community self-defence forces. Criminal networks may control trafficking routes, extort businesses or corrupt officials. Some armed groups perform governance functions such as taxation, dispute resolution or security. Their authority may be coercive and illegitimate under international law, yet operationally real.

Assessment should examine:

• territorial control and mobility;
• command structure and internal cohesion;
• financing sources;
• relationships with local communities and state actors;
• access to weapons and communications;
• objectives and willingness to negotiate; and
• the group’s capacity to disrupt infrastructure or personnel.

A fragmented group may be less predictable than a centralized one. A ceasefire with political leadership may not bind local commanders. Payments to secure access may constitute bribery, sanctions violations or material support for terrorism. Firms must obtain specialized legal advice and follow applicable sanctions, anti-corruption and humanitarian rules.

The presence of an armed group also creates a dilemma: withdrawal may protect employees but deprive communities of services; continued operations may sustain livelihoods but expose the company to accusations of legitimizing or financing violence. Decisions should be governed by clear red lines, human-rights due diligence and board-level oversight.

7. Diasporas and Transnational Communities

Diasporas are communities living outside an ancestral homeland while maintaining social, economic, cultural or political connections to it. They can contribute remittances, investment, skills, advocacy and humanitarian assistance. They may also influence elections, foreign policy and conflict narratives in both host and origin countries.

Diaspora networks are heterogeneous. Age, class, region, religion, political ideology and migration history shape their preferences. It is dangerous to treat a diaspora as a single bloc. Some members promote reconciliation; others finance competing political or armed factions. Digital platforms can amplify the most mobilized voices without making them representative.

For international business, diaspora networks may provide market knowledge, trusted intermediaries and recruitment channels. They may also generate boycott campaigns, political pressure or reputational disputes. Due diligence should address remittance channels, sanctions exposure, political fundraising and the risk of stereotyping communities.

8. Technology Platforms and Digital Infrastructure

Large technology platforms occupy a distinctive position. They are private firms, but their services can function as public communication infrastructure. Search engines, social-media platforms, cloud providers, app stores, payment systems and satellite services influence information flows, economic access and crisis response.

Their geopolitical influence arises from:

• control over data and algorithms;
• decisions about content moderation and account access;
• cloud, payment and communications infrastructure;
• digital advertising and identity systems;
• cybersecurity capabilities; and
• the ability to scale narratives rapidly across borders.

Platforms face competing demands. Governments may request censorship, surveillance or data access. Users may demand privacy and free expression. Advertisers may reject harmful content. Civil society may criticize both excessive moderation and insufficient moderation. Platform decisions can therefore become geopolitical events.

Artificial intelligence intensifies these issues. Generative systems can lower the cost of propaganda, impersonation, phishing and synthetic media, while also improving translation, threat detection and crisis analysis. Organizations should assess model provenance, data governance, access controls, human oversight and the possibility that automated systems reproduce political bias.

Technology risk is also infrastructural. A cloud outage, undersea-cable disruption, cyberattack or export restriction can affect several countries simultaneously. Concentration in a small number of providers creates systemic dependency. Resilience requires redundancy, tested continuity plans, diversified suppliers and careful treatment of sensitive data.

9. Frameworks for Actor Analysis

9.1 The actor–interest–capability–constraint framework

A practical profile can be constructed using four dimensions:

The analyst should add time horizon and trigger conditions. An actor may tolerate a project during economic expansion but oppose it during an election or currency crisis.

9.2 Stakeholder salience

Stakeholder salience can be assessed through power, legitimacy and urgency. Power concerns the ability to affect the organization. Legitimacy concerns whether the claim is socially or legally recognized. Urgency concerns the need for immediate attention. A local community may initially have limited power but high legitimacy and urgency after an environmental incident. An investor may possess power and urgency but weak legitimacy for demanding an outcome that violates local law.

This framework should not be used mechanically. Low-power stakeholders can become influential through alliances, litigation or media attention.

9.3 Network and dependency analysis

Network analysis examines relationships rather than isolated actors. Important measures include centrality, brokerage and redundancy. A firm should identify single points of failure: one port, one payment processor, one cloud provider, one political intermediary or one border crossing.

Dependency is not simply a function of exposure. It also depends on substitutability. A firm may be highly dependent on a supplier if alternatives are slow, expensive or politically inaccessible. Scenario planning should therefore ask how quickly a relationship can be replaced and at what cost.

9.4 Expected-loss prioritization

Where probabilities and impacts can be estimated with reasonable discipline, a simple prioritization measure is expected loss:

Here, EL is expected loss in monetary units, p_i is the estimated probability of scenario i, L_i is the loss if that scenario occurs, and n is the number of mutually exclusive scenarios. Probabilities should sum to 1 when the scenarios are exhaustive. The formula assumes that the scenarios and losses are defined consistently and that the decision-maker is using expected value as a prioritization aid, not as a prediction of the exact outcome.

For example, suppose a project faces three mutually exclusive annual scenarios: disruption costing $2 million with probability 0.20, severe disruption costing $8 million with probability 0.05, and no material disruption with probability 0.75. Expected loss is:

This result does not imply that the firm will lose exactly $800,000. It does not capture liquidity constraints, distributional effects, catastrophic thresholds or ethical concerns. Low-probability, high-impact events may require mitigation even when their expected loss is modest.

10. Applied Case: The Meridian Digital Corridor

This is an illustrative case, not a report of a specific real-world project.

Background

Meridian Systems, an MNE, proposes to build a fibre-optic corridor, data centre and logistics hub in the fictional state of Arandia. The project is supported by Arandia’s central government and financed partly by a regional development bank. The corridor would connect three neighbouring markets and provide cloud services to public agencies and manufacturers.

The proposed route crosses a province governed by an opposition-controlled local administration. A community organization claims that land acquisition was inadequate. An armed group operates in remote areas near the route and collects informal transit fees. A diaspora association in Europe campaigns against the project, alleging that the central government will use the data centre for surveillance. A global technology platform is considering providing cloud capacity but faces export-control and data-protection obligations in its home jurisdiction.

Problem

Meridian must decide whether to proceed, redesign the project or withdraw. A purely state-centred analysis would focus on the central government’s approval. That would overlook local authority, community legitimacy, armed-group disruption, diaspora advocacy, platform dependency and development-bank safeguards.

Analysis

The central government has formal authority and offers tax incentives, but its legitimacy is contested in the province. The local administration controls land-use cooperation and can delay construction. The development bank has financial leverage and environmental and social conditions. The community organization has limited coercive power but high legitimacy and the ability to generate litigation and reputational pressure. The armed group has coercive capacity near the route but is internally fragmented. The diaspora association has informational and lobbying power in important investor jurisdictions. The technology platform controls a critical service input and can impose contractual and compliance requirements.

The major dependencies are:

1. land access and community consent;
2. physical security along the corridor;
3. lawful cross-border data transfer;
4. development-bank disbursement; and
5. availability of cloud and payment services.

Approach

Meridian establishes an independent stakeholder process, publishes a route-impact assessment and creates a grievance mechanism with local representation. It negotiates a transparent community-benefit agreement rather than relying only on central-government assurances. The project is divided into phases, beginning with less exposed segments and including decision gates tied to security and consent indicators.

The firm also diversifies cloud providers, designs local failover capacity, restricts access to sensitive public-sector data and commissions an external human-rights assessment. It refuses informal payments to armed actors and coordinates security planning with lawful authorities while ensuring that contracted security personnel follow human-rights standards. The development bank is invited to monitor compliance publicly.

Outcome

Construction begins after the local administration and affected communities approve revised land procedures. One route segment is relocated, increasing cost but reducing conflict exposure. The cloud provider proceeds after a legal review and stronger data-governance controls. The armed group later disrupts a remote section, but phased construction and redundant routing limit the outage. The project experiences delay and higher capital expenditure, yet avoids a larger legitimacy crisis and retains financing.

Learning points

First, formal authorization is not equivalent to operational legitimacy. Second, non-state actors can affect project value even without legal ownership of the asset. Third, redundancy and phased investment convert geopolitical uncertainty into manageable decision points. Fourth, ethical safeguards are not merely reputational devices; they can improve continuity and reduce escalation. Finally, actor analysis must be updated because alliances, leadership and capabilities change over time.

11. Governance, Ethics and Professional Practice

Actor engagement creates ethical obligations. Firms should not use local divisions to secure unfair advantage, make payments that finance violence or exploit weak regulation to avoid accountability. They should respect human rights, protect personal data, avoid discriminatory profiling and provide remedy where operations cause harm.

A professional geopolitical-risk process should include:

• documented assumptions and confidence levels;
• source triangulation rather than reliance on a single informant;
• separation of fact, inference and forecast;
• protection of confidential and personal information;
• explicit treatment of uncertainty and alternative scenarios;
• legal review of sanctions, anti-corruption and export controls;
• consultation with affected stakeholders; and
• periodic reassessment after elections, crises, leadership changes or incidents.

Analysts must also recognize their own biases. Government sources may understate abuses; activist sources may emphasize them; commercial consultants may overstate certainty; digital data may overrepresent urban and highly connected populations. Good assessment makes these limitations visible.

12. Contemporary Developments

Several developments are reshaping actor relations. First, economic security policies increasingly link trade, technology and national security. Investment screening, supply-chain restrictions and semiconductor controls can transform ordinary commercial decisions into strategic questions.

Second, private infrastructure providers are becoming essential to state capacity. Cloud services, satellite imagery, payment networks and cybersecurity companies may be indispensable during conflict or disaster. This increases the need for public–private coordination but also raises accountability concerns.

Third, influence operations are becoming more decentralized. States may use intermediaries, online communities or commercial data brokers rather than openly communicating through official channels. Attribution is consequently difficult, and premature attribution can itself escalate tensions.

Fourth, climate change is intensifying competition over land, water, food, migration routes and critical minerals. The relevant actors include states, indigenous communities, companies, armed groups, humanitarian agencies and local governments. Climate-related geopolitical risk is therefore an actor and governance problem, not only an environmental problem.

Chapter Summary

Geopolitical risk is generated through relationships among states, institutions and non-state actors. States retain sovereign authority, but their capacity and legitimacy vary, and domestic agencies may disagree. International institutions and regional blocs provide rules, finance, coordination and dispute mechanisms, while also creating overlapping obligations and potential fragmentation.

MNEs are both exposed to geopolitical risk and capable of shaping it through investment, technology, employment and supply chains. NGOs influence legitimacy, evidence and reputation. Armed groups and criminal networks may exercise de facto control and disrupt operations even without lawful authority. Diasporas connect domestic politics across borders through remittances, advocacy and narratives. Technology platforms influence information, data, infrastructure and public debate, making private firms important geopolitical actors.

Effective assessment moves beyond an actor inventory. It maps interests, capabilities, access, constraints, dependencies, legitimacy and escalation pathways. Expected-loss analysis can help prioritize scenarios, but it must be supplemented by resilience planning, ethical judgment and attention to low-probability catastrophic events. The central managerial lesson is that legally approved projects can still fail if they lack social legitimacy, local cooperation, technological resilience or credible safeguards.

Key Terms

State capacity: The ability of public institutions to formulate and implement policy.

Legitimacy: The perceived rightfulness or acceptability of authority.

Sovereignty: The supreme legal authority of a state over its territory and external relations.

International institution: A rule-based organization or regime created to coordinate states and other participants.

Regional bloc: A group of states cooperating through regional economic, political or security arrangements.

Multinational enterprise: A firm that owns or controls productive or service activities in more than one country.

Non-state actor: An influential organization or network that is not a sovereign government.

De facto authority: Practical control or governance without necessarily possessing formal legal status.

Veto player: An actor whose opposition can block a proposed decision or outcome.

Gatekeeper: An actor controlling access to a resource, process, network or decision.

Spoiler: An actor that benefits from preventing cooperation or settlement.

Social licence to operate: Continuing community and stakeholder acceptance of an organization’s activities.

Diaspora: A transnational community maintaining connections with an ancestral homeland.

Platform governance: Rules and practices through which digital platforms manage access, content and user behaviour.

Network centrality: The importance of an actor’s position within a network of relationships.

Dependency: Exposure to a relationship or resource that is difficult to replace.

Expected loss: The probability-weighted average loss across defined scenarios.

Political risk insurance: Insurance designed to protect against specified government-related or political events.

Human-rights due diligence: A process for identifying, preventing, mitigating and addressing human-rights impacts.

Review Questions

Short Answer Questions

1. Distinguish authority, power and influence in geopolitical-risk analysis.
2. Why should a government not always be treated as a unified actor?
3. Identify two ways in which regional blocs can create both opportunity and risk for MNEs.
4. How can NGOs influence the risk profile of an infrastructure project?
5. Why are technology platforms considered geopolitical actors?

Long Answer Questions

1. Explain how state capacity and legitimacy affect the implementation and durability of an international investment project.
2. Compare the geopolitical roles of international institutions and regional blocs.
3. Discuss the political responsibilities and vulnerabilities of MNEs operating between home-state and host-state interests.
4. Analyze the operational risks created by armed groups and de facto authorities, including the ethical problems associated with engagement.
5. Explain how actor mapping, dependency analysis and scenario planning can be integrated into a corporate geopolitical-risk process.

Analytical / Application Questions

1. A foreign investor has central-government approval for a mining project, but local communities, an opposition-controlled province and an international NGO oppose it. Construct an actor map and recommend a decision process.
2. A company depends on one cloud provider, one port and one payment network in a politically unstable country. Identify the main vulnerabilities and design a resilience strategy.
3. Using the expected-loss formula, calculate the expected annual loss where a minor disruption has probability 0.30 and cost $1 million, a major disruption has probability 0.10 and cost $6 million, and no disruption has probability 0.60 and cost $0. Explain why the result should not be the sole basis for the investment decision.

Multiple Choice Questions with Answers

Question 1

Which statement best distinguishes authority from power?

A. Authority is recognized decision-making right, while power is the capacity to produce an outcome.

B. Authority exists only in private companies, while power exists only in states.

C. Authority refers exclusively to military force, while power refers exclusively to law.

D. Authority and power are identical in all political systems.

Correct Answer: A. Authority is recognized decision-making right, while power is the capacity to produce an outcome.

Question 2

Which factor most directly reflects state capacity?

A. The popularity of a national flag

B. The ability to implement policy and deliver public services

C. The number of languages spoken by citizens

D. The age of the constitution

Correct Answer: B. The ability to implement policy and deliver public services

Question 3

What is a likely benefit of a regional bloc for an international firm?

A. Guaranteed immunity from all national regulations

B. A larger integrated market and reduced transaction costs

C. Elimination of all political contagion

D. Removal of the need for country-level due diligence

Correct Answer: B. A larger integrated market and reduced transaction costs

Question 4

Why can an MNE be considered a geopolitical actor?

A. It always possesses sovereign territory.

B. Its investment, technology and supply-chain decisions can affect state interests and public security.

C. It is legally identical to an international court.

D. It cannot be influenced by governments.

Correct Answer: B. Its investment, technology and supply-chain decisions can affect state interests and public security.

Question 5

Which characteristic is especially important when assessing an armed group?

A. Its corporate dividend policy

B. Its territorial control, financing and command cohesion

C. Its customer-retention rate

D. Its compliance with ordinary commercial advertising standards

Correct Answer: B. Its territorial control, financing and command cohesion

Question 6

What does social licence to operate refer to?

A. A permit issued automatically by a national ministry

B. Continuing acceptance by communities and relevant stakeholders

C. A patent for a socially useful invention

D. A company’s authority to censor public criticism

Correct Answer: B. Continuing acceptance by communities and relevant stakeholders

Question 7

Which capability gives technology platforms distinctive geopolitical influence?

A. Control over information flows, data and digital access

B. Exclusive control over national armies

C. The power to issue passports

D. Automatic authority over international treaties

Correct Answer: A. Control over information flows, data and digital access

Question 8

In the expected-loss formula, what does pᵢ represent?

A. The physical size of an asset

B. The estimated probability of scenario i

C. The political ideology of an actor

D. The price of insurance in scenario i

Correct Answer: B. The estimated probability of scenario i

Question 9

A project has a 0.20 probability of a $2 million loss and a 0.05 probability of an $8 million loss, with no loss otherwise. What is its expected loss?

A. $200,000

B. $400,000

C. $800,000

D. $1,000,000

Correct Answer: C. $800,000

Question 10

Which practice best improves the quality of actor-centred geopolitical analysis?

A. Relying on a single government source

B. Treating all members of a diaspora as politically identical

C. Separating verified facts from inferences and forecasts

D. Assuming formal legal approval guarantees local acceptance

Correct Answer: C. Separating verified facts from inferences and forecasts