Embedded Systems for IoT

Chapter 15
Product Deployment, Fleet Operations and Emerging Trends

Diploma in IOT
Embedded Systems for IoT   •   Diploma

Product Deployment, Fleet Operations and Emerging Trends

Introduction

An Internet of Things (IoT) product is not complete when a prototype successfully sends sensor data. It becomes a product only when it can be manufactured consistently, certified legally, secured throughout its life, updated safely, monitored operationally, repaired economically, and retired responsibly. The transition from laboratory prototype to a fleet of thousands or millions of embedded devices therefore requires both engineering and operational planning.

This chapter examines that transition. It begins with productisation, sourcing, certification, cost analysis, and build-versus-buy decisions. It then considers the operational management of deployed devices: identity, provisioning, secure over-the-air (OTA) updates, observability, digital twins, maintenance, and end-of-life processes. The final sections assess important emerging trends, including chiplets, RISC-V, Matter, ambient computing, and autonomous edge systems.

Learning Objectives

By the end of this chapter, a learner should be able to:

  • distinguish a prototype from a production-ready IoT product;
  • plan a transition from engineering validation to manufacturing;
  • evaluate component sourcing, certification, lifecycle risk, and total cost;
  • compare build-versus-buy alternatives;
  • design basic device identity, provisioning, OTA, and fleet-observability processes;
  • explain digital twins and predictive maintenance at an operational level;
  • assess the opportunities and limitations of chiplets, RISC-V, Matter, ambient computing, and autonomous edge computing;
  • identify security, privacy, safety, environmental, and regulatory responsibilities.

1. From Prototype to Production

A prototype is primarily an instrument for learning. It may use development boards, hand-soldered wiring, temporary cloud credentials, laboratory power supplies, and manually installed firmware. A production product must instead be repeatable, supportable, secure, compliant, and economically viable.

A useful productisation sequence is:

  1. Proof of concept: demonstrates technical feasibility.
  2. Engineering prototype: integrates selected sensors, processors, communications, power systems, and firmware.
  3. Design validation: tests whether the design meets functional, environmental, electrical, security, and usability requirements.
  4. Production validation: tests manufacturing processes, fixtures, test software, packaging, traceability, and supply-chain procedures.
  5. Pilot production: produces a limited quantity under near-final conditions.
  6. Mass production and operations: controls quality, deployment, updates, incidents, maintenance, and retirement.

The stages are not strictly linear. Field failures may require a return from production validation to design validation. A disciplined programme maintains a requirements traceability matrix linking each requirement to a design element, verification method, result, and responsible owner.

Design-for-X principles

Design-for-manufacture and assembly (DFMA) reduces the number of parts, assembly operations, orientations, and manual interventions. Design-for-testability provides test points, diagnostic modes, serial-number recording, and automated functional tests. Design-for-serviceability makes batteries, seals, connectors, and replaceable modules accessible where maintenance is expected. Design-for-security includes secure boot, protected keys, signed firmware, debug-port control, and safe failure behaviour from the beginning rather than as an afterthought.

A production design should also have a controlled bill of materials (BOM). The BOM identifies manufacturer part numbers, approved alternatives, revision status, lifecycle state, quantities, and critical characteristics. A software bill of materials (SBOM) records software components and versions so that vulnerabilities can be assessed after deployment.

2. Component Sourcing and Supply-Chain Risk

Component selection is a system decision, not simply a search for the lowest unit price. The engineer must consider electrical performance, environmental ratings, availability, lead time, minimum order quantity, second sources, tooling, firmware support, security history, and expected product lifetime.

Important sourcing questions include:

  • Is the component active, mature, obsolete, or approaching a last-time buy?
  • Is it available through authorised distributors?
  • Can an equivalent component be substituted without redesigning the PCB or firmware?
  • Are secure elements, radio modules, and sensors available in the required volume?
  • Does the supplier publish change notifications and vulnerability information?
  • Are geographic, export-control, counterfeit, or ethical-sourcing risks relevant?

A single-source component may be acceptable when it provides unique capability, but its risk should be documented and mitigated through inventory, redesign planning, or an approved alternative. Long-lived IoT products benefit from lifecycle agreements and periodic supply-chain reviews.

Cost structure and total cost of ownership

The unit manufacturing cost is only one part of product economics. A simplified total cost of ownership per device can be represented as:

TCO = Ch + Cm + Ct + Cs + Cc + Co + Cr − Ve

Here, Ch is hardware and assembly cost, Cm is manufacturing and test cost, Ct is tooling amortisation per unit, Cs is shipping and installation cost, Cc is certification and compliance cost allocated per unit, Co is expected operational cost over the service life, Cr is expected repair, replacement, and disposal cost, and Ve is residual or recovery value. All terms must use the same currency and time basis. If costs occur at different times, financial analysis should discount future costs using an explicitly selected discount rate.

For example, suppose a device has hardware and assembly cost of $24, test cost of $2, tooling allocation of $1, installation cost of $5, allocated certification cost of $3, five-year connectivity and cloud cost of $8, and expected repair cost of $2. If residual value is negligible, then:

TCO = 24 + 2 + 1 + 5 + 3 + 8 + 2 = $45

The result is not a selling price. It is a life-cycle cost estimate used for engineering and business decisions.

Costs should also be analysed by sensitivity. If cellular connectivity is uncertain, scenarios such as low, expected, and high data consumption may be more useful than a single forecast. Reliability improvements that increase unit cost may still reduce total cost if they substantially reduce field service visits.

3. Certification, Compliance and Product Responsibility

IoT products combine electronics, radio transmitters, software, personal data, and sometimes safety-critical functions. Compliance therefore depends on product category and jurisdiction. Typical areas include:

  • electromagnetic compatibility and radio requirements;
  • electrical safety and power-supply requirements;
  • environmental restrictions and materials declarations;
  • cybersecurity and vulnerability-management obligations;
  • privacy and data-protection law;
  • battery transport, recycling, and disposal rules;
  • sector-specific requirements for healthcare, vehicles, buildings, or industrial control.

Certification is not merely a final laboratory test. The design must preserve required antenna configurations, enclosure materials, power limits, separation distances, and software behaviour. A radio-module certificate may reduce testing effort, but it does not automatically certify the complete host product.

A compliance plan should identify applicable standards, test laboratories, technical documentation, responsible persons, evidence retention, change-control rules, and post-market obligations. Changing an antenna, enclosure, power amplifier, firmware radio setting, or safety-critical component can invalidate previous evidence.

Privacy engineering should follow data minimisation, purpose limitation, access control, retention limits, and transparent user communication. A temperature sensor may appear harmless, but location, occupancy, usage patterns, or voice data can reveal sensitive information when combined with other datasets.

4. Build-versus-Buy Decisions

An organisation may build firmware, device-management services, gateways, dashboards, security infrastructure, or hardware modules internally; purchase them; or combine both approaches. The decision should consider strategic differentiation, technical maturity, integration effort, intellectual property, supplier dependence, security responsibility, time to market, and long-term operating cost.

Decision factorBuild is favoured whenBuy is favoured when
DifferentiationCapability is central to competitive advantageCapability is commodity infrastructure
SkillsRequired expertise exists internallySpecialist expertise is scarce
TimeThere is time to develop and maintainRapid deployment is important
ControlDeep customisation and ownership are requiredStandard interfaces are sufficient
RiskThe organisation can assume security and support dutiesA proven supplier reduces implementation risk
LifecycleLong-term independence is strategically importantSupplier has credible continuity and support

A decision should use total cost rather than purchase price. Build cost includes architecture, development, testing, certification, documentation, staff, security maintenance, incident response, and opportunity cost. Buy cost includes licences, integration, migration, data egress, support, contractual restrictions, and the risk of vendor discontinuation.

A practical approach is to build the differentiating layer and buy mature enabling components. For example, an organisation may buy a certified radio module and device-management platform while developing its own sensing algorithm and user workflow. This is not automatically optimal; interfaces, data ownership, update authority, and exit plans must be contractually and technically clear.

5. Device Identity, Provisioning and Trust

A fleet cannot be securely managed if devices have indistinguishable or shared identities. Each device should have a unique identity, normally represented by a device identifier and a cryptographic key or certificate. Identity must be established in a trusted manufacturing or provisioning process.

A common lifecycle is:

  1. generate or inject a unique key in a protected environment;
  2. record the device identity and hardware provenance;
  3. authenticate the device during first connection;
  4. authorise only the services and operations required;
  5. rotate, revoke, or replace credentials when necessary;
  6. retire the identity when the device is decommissioned.

A secure element or trusted execution environment can protect private keys from ordinary application firmware. Secure boot verifies that only authorised firmware executes. Mutual TLS or an equivalent authenticated protocol can protect device-to-service communication, although protocol selection must match device resources and system requirements.

Manufacturing databases should avoid exposing private keys and should provide auditable links among serial number, hardware revision, firmware, certificate, batch, and destination. Shared default passwords are unacceptable for production fleets. Debug interfaces should be disabled, authenticated, or physically protected in the final configuration.

6. Fleet Operations and OTA Updates

Fleet operations treat devices as a population with common policies but potentially different hardware revisions, locations, connectivity conditions, and risk profiles. Essential operational capabilities include inventory, configuration, health reporting, remote commands, update management, alerting, access control, and audit logs.

Safe OTA design

An OTA system should provide:

  • cryptographically signed images and verification before installation;
  • encrypted transport where confidentiality is required;
  • version and anti-rollback controls;
  • atomic or fail-safe installation;
  • recovery through a known-good image or boot partition;
  • staged rollout, monitoring, pause, and rollback procedures;
  • compatibility checks for hardware, bootloader, storage, and configuration;
  • signed metadata describing image, target population, and dependencies.

A staged rollout may begin with laboratory devices, then internal devices, a small percentage of the field fleet, and finally the wider population. The release decision should use defined indicators such as boot success, crash rate, connectivity, battery impact, and application correctness. Updating every device simultaneously creates unnecessary correlated risk.

Bandwidth, energy, and storage constraints matter. A battery-powered device may need to download in fragments, resume interrupted transfers, verify integrity before activation, and postpone installation until energy is adequate. A device that cannot update safely may become a security and commercial liability.

Observability

Observability is the ability to infer internal system state from externally collected evidence. For IoT, evidence may include logs, metrics, traces, events, device-reported state, gateway data, and cloud-service records. Useful metrics include last-seen time, signal quality, battery voltage, reset reason, firmware version, sensor plausibility, update status, and command latency.

Telemetry must be designed carefully. Excessive logging consumes energy, bandwidth, storage, and money; insufficient logging prevents diagnosis. Data should be sampled, aggregated, rate-limited, and protected against sensitive-data leakage. Time synchronisation is important for incident reconstruction, but devices may need to operate when clocks are inaccurate or disconnected.

Operational targets should be measurable. For example, a service-level objective may require that 99% of healthy connected devices report within a specified interval. The target must define the population, measurement window, exclusion rules, and consequences; otherwise it is not a meaningful operational metric.

7. Digital Twins and Maintenance

A digital twin is a software representation of a physical asset that maintains relevant identity, configuration, state, history, and relationships. It is more than a dashboard. A useful twin distinguishes:

  • desired state: what operators request;
  • reported state: what the device claims;
  • observed state: what gateways, sensors, or services independently measure;
  • historical state: changes and events over time.

For example, the desired sampling interval may be 10 minutes while the reported interval is 10 minutes, but observed battery depletion may indicate that the device is operating incorrectly. The twin should represent uncertainty and timestamp data rather than implying that every value is current or correct.

Maintenance can be corrective, preventive, condition-based, or predictive. Corrective maintenance responds after failure. Preventive maintenance replaces or services components according to time or usage. Condition-based maintenance acts on measured health indicators. Predictive maintenance estimates future failure risk using historical and real-time data.

A simple reliability measure is the proportion of devices functioning at a specified observation time. If N0 devices are deployed and Nf(t) have failed by time t, then the empirical survival proportion is:

S(t) = (N0 − Nf(t)) / N0

This expression is a descriptive proportion, not a universal failure law. It assumes a clearly defined cohort and failure criterion. Censored observations—devices removed, lost, or still operating at the end of observation—require more appropriate reliability methods when accurate lifetime analysis is needed.

Predictive models can classify anomalies, estimate remaining useful life, or rank maintenance priorities. However, model accuracy can degrade after firmware changes, seasonal shifts, sensor drift, or changes in operating population. Human review, confidence thresholds, retraining procedures, and safe fallback behaviour remain necessary.

8. Deployment Governance and End of Life

Deployment should include asset ownership, installation records, geographic or organisational assignment, acceptance tests, user training, and incident contacts. Physical access is often overlooked: a device installed on a roof, in a public space, or inside industrial machinery may be expensive or dangerous to retrieve.

End-of-life planning includes data export, account closure, credential revocation, secure deletion, recycling, replacement, and customer communication. A device should not continue authenticating after ownership ends. Retired hardware may contain personal data, network credentials, or proprietary firmware. Disposal procedures must therefore address both environmental and information security risks.

Governance should allocate responsibility across engineering, operations, security, legal, procurement, customer support, and environmental compliance. A technically excellent device can still fail as a product if no team owns vulnerability response or field replacement.

9. Emerging Trends

Chiplets

Chiplets are separately manufactured dies integrated within a package. They can allow functional blocks such as compute, memory, I/O, or accelerators to be combined more flexibly than a single monolithic die. Potential benefits include reuse, heterogeneous technology integration, and improved product segmentation. Challenges include interconnect standards, thermal design, package testing, yield economics, security boundaries, and the difficulty of validating a multi-die system. Chiplets are more immediately influential in high-performance and specialised systems than in every low-cost sensor node, but they may enable capable edge gateways and AI devices.

RISC-V

RISC-V is an open instruction-set architecture rather than a single processor product. Its modular instruction-set approach can support custom extensions and reduce dependence on one proprietary architecture. For IoT, possible advantages include educational accessibility, design flexibility, and specialised acceleration. Risks include fragmented software ecosystems, variable implementation quality, verification burden, toolchain maturity, and the fact that an open instruction set does not automatically make a chip secure or open-source. Security still depends on implementation, boot architecture, memory protection, update mechanisms, and supply-chain practices.

Matter

Matter is an application-layer interoperability initiative for smart-home devices. It aims to allow compatible devices from different vendors to communicate through common models and commissioning processes, using supported IP networking technologies. Matter can reduce integration friction, but it does not eliminate the need for good radio design, reliable networks, secure credentials, manufacturer support, privacy controls, or correct device semantics. Certification and version compatibility remain important.

Ambient computing

Ambient computing places computing into environments so that interaction becomes less dependent on explicit screens or commands. Examples include context-aware lighting, occupancy-aware buildings, wearable sensing, and voice or gesture interfaces. Its benefits include convenience and accessibility; its risks include continuous surveillance, inference of personal behaviour, unclear consent, accidental activation, and difficult-to-understand data flows. Ambient systems should expose status, provide meaningful controls, minimise collection, and fail safely.

Autonomous edge systems

An autonomous edge system senses, decides, and acts near the physical environment without relying continuously on a distant cloud. Local operation can reduce latency, bandwidth, and dependence on connectivity. It is valuable for industrial control, robotics, transport, and safety monitoring. Nevertheless, autonomy raises assurance questions: What happens when the model is uncertain? Can an operator override it? How are decisions logged? How are models updated? What safe state is selected during sensor failure or adversarial input?

AI at the edge should be evaluated not only by accuracy but also by energy, latency, memory, explainability, robustness, bias, and consequences of error. A cloud-trained model may not generalise to a new sensor, location, or population. Safety-related autonomy requires hazard analysis, validation under abnormal conditions, bounded authority, and a recovery path.

10. Integrated Illustrative Case: Smart Cold-Chain Monitoring

Background

A logistics company wants to monitor vaccine containers during transport. Each container requires temperature measurement, location records, tamper indication, and alerts when conditions exceed permitted limits. The device must operate for several weeks, communicate through changing networks, and provide evidence to customers and regulators.

Problem

An initial prototype uses a development board, a consumer GPS module, a shared cloud password, and manual firmware installation. It works in a laboratory but has excessive battery consumption, no secure identity, uncertain calibration, and no recovery process when an update fails.

Analysis

The product team identifies temperature accuracy, battery life, network coverage, data integrity, certificate management, calibration evidence, OTA recovery, and disposal as critical requirements. It also recognises that a missed alert is more serious than a delayed dashboard update. Therefore, local threshold detection is retained even when cloud connectivity is unavailable.

Approach and solution

The team selects an industrial temperature sensor, a certified communications module, and a secure element. Each device receives a unique identity during controlled manufacturing. The firmware stores readings locally, signs important event records, and transmits summaries when connected. A dual-image bootloader supports signed, staged OTA updates with automatic rollback. The fleet platform maintains desired and reported configuration, while operators receive alerts for threshold breaches, low battery, missing reports, and tamper events.

The company buys the certified radio and fleet-management foundation but builds the temperature-quality logic and customer workflow internally. Pilot production tests calibration, enclosure sealing, radio performance, battery endurance, manufacturing traceability, and update recovery. Certification evidence is reviewed after enclosure and antenna changes.

Outcome

The resulting product is more expensive than the prototype but has lower operational risk. Devices can be authenticated, monitored, updated, and retired. Local alert logic preserves essential protection during connectivity loss, while the digital twin provides shipment identity, current state, and event history.

Learning points

The case demonstrates that production readiness is a system property. Secure identity, hardware selection, software architecture, certification, manufacturing controls, and operations must be designed together. It also demonstrates that build-versus-buy decisions should preserve internal ownership of the capability that differentiates the product.

11. Challenges and Best Practices

IoT deployment remains difficult because physical devices experience weather, vibration, battery ageing, radio interference, theft, tampering, and intermittent connectivity. Fleets also contain multiple hardware revisions and imperfect data. Common failure patterns include shared credentials, undocumented components, untested rollback, excessive telemetry, unsupported legacy devices, and unclear ownership of incidents.

Recommended practices are to:

  • maintain a controlled hardware and software BOM;
  • assign a unique identity to every device;
  • automate manufacturing tests and retain traceability;
  • define certification and change-control requirements early;
  • use signed firmware, secure boot, anti-rollback, and recovery paths;
  • stage updates and monitor measurable release criteria;
  • distinguish desired, reported, observed, and historical state;
  • minimise data and protect privacy by design;
  • plan replacement, vulnerability response, and end of life;
  • test degraded operation, including loss of power, network, time, and cloud service;
  • document assumptions behind reliability, cost, and predictive models;
  • provide human override and safe states for autonomous systems.

Chapter Summary

Product deployment is the managed transition from a learning prototype to a repeatable, compliant, supportable, and secure product. The transition requires design validation, production validation, DFMA, testability, controlled BOMs, supply-chain planning, and certification evidence. Total cost of ownership includes hardware, manufacturing, installation, connectivity, cloud operation, repair, compliance, and disposal rather than only purchase price.

Fleet operations depend on unique device identities, secure provisioning, least-privilege access, signed OTA updates, rollback, observability, and lifecycle governance. Digital twins connect desired, reported, observed, and historical states, while maintenance strategies range from corrective to predictive. Reliability measurements must be interpreted according to their assumptions and data limitations.

Chiplets, RISC-V, Matter, ambient computing, and autonomous edge systems provide important opportunities but introduce new integration, assurance, privacy, interoperability, and security challenges. Across all trends, responsible deployment requires measurable requirements, secure lifecycle processes, human accountability, safe failure behaviour, and an explicit end-of-life plan.

Key Terms

Device identity: A unique logical and cryptographic identity assigned to an IoT device.

Digital twin: A software representation of a physical asset and its relevant state, history, and relationships.

DFMA: Design for manufacture and assembly; designing products for efficient, repeatable production.

Fleet operations: The monitoring, configuration, updating, support, and retirement of deployed devices.

OTA update: A software or firmware update delivered remotely over a network.

Secure boot: A boot process that permits execution only of authorised software.

Rollback: Restoration of a previously known-good firmware version after update failure.

SBOM: Software bill of materials listing software components and versions.

BOM: Bill of materials listing the hardware components used in a product.

Total cost of ownership: The complete life-cycle cost of acquiring, deploying, operating, maintaining, and retiring an asset.

Provisioning: The controlled process of assigning identity, credentials, configuration, and ownership to a device.

Observability: The ability to infer system condition from logs, metrics, traces, events, and state data.

Predictive maintenance: Maintenance planned using evidence or models of future failure risk.

Chiplet: A separately manufactured die integrated with other dies in one package.

RISC-V: An open instruction-set architecture used as a basis for processor implementations.

Matter: An application-layer interoperability standard or ecosystem for compatible smart-home devices.

Ambient computing: Computing embedded in an environment to provide context-aware interaction.

Edge autonomy: Local sensing, decision-making, and action without continuous cloud dependence.

Anti-rollback: A control preventing installation of an older or revoked firmware version.

Review Questions

Short Answer Questions

  1. Why is a prototype not necessarily a production-ready IoT product?
  2. Name four factors that should be considered when sourcing components.
  3. What is the difference between desired state and reported state in a digital twin?
  4. Why are staged OTA rollouts safer than updating an entire fleet simultaneously?
  5. State two risks associated with ambient computing.

Long Answer Questions

  1. Explain a suitable process for transitioning an IoT device from engineering prototype to mass production.
  2. Discuss the factors that should influence a build-versus-buy decision for an IoT platform.
  3. Describe the major security requirements of a production OTA update system.
  4. Compare corrective, preventive, condition-based, and predictive maintenance.
  5. Explain the opportunities and limitations of RISC-V and chiplet-based designs for edge systems.

Analytical / Application Questions

  1. A company estimates per-device costs of $18 for hardware, $3 for assembly and testing, $2 for installation, $4 for allocated certification, $10 for five-year connectivity and cloud operation, and $3 for expected repair. Calculate the estimated total cost of ownership, assuming zero residual value, and identify two costs that could change significantly with fleet scale.
  2. Design a secure lifecycle for a battery-powered environmental sensor, covering manufacturing identity, first connection, routine operation, OTA update, credential compromise, and retirement.
  3. A factory wants an autonomous edge system to stop a machine when vibration indicates a possible failure. Analyse the benefits, failure modes, human-override requirements, data needed for validation, and safe behaviour when the model is uncertain or connectivity is lost.

Multiple Choice Questions with Answers

Question 1

Which characteristic most clearly distinguishes a production-ready IoT device from a laboratory prototype?

A. It uses the newest available processor.

B. It can be manufactured, secured, certified, updated, and supported repeatably.

C. It contains more sensors than the prototype.

D. It sends all data directly to a public cloud.

Correct Answer: B. It can be manufactured, secured, certified, updated, and supported repeatably.

Question 2

Which item is normally part of a software bill of materials (SBOM)?

A. The device enclosure colour

B. The installation site address only

C. Software components and their versions

D. The operator’s maintenance schedule

Correct Answer: C. Software components and their versions

Question 3

What is the primary purpose of secure boot?

A. To increase radio transmission power

B. To ensure that only authorised software executes

C. To reduce sensor calibration time

D. To compress cloud telemetry

Correct Answer: B. To ensure that only authorised software executes

Question 4

Why should OTA updates commonly be deployed in stages?

A. To make firmware signatures unnecessary

B. To reduce the need for device identities

C. To limit the impact of a defective release and gather evidence before wider deployment

D. To prevent all devices from ever receiving the same version

Correct Answer: C. To limit the impact of a defective release and gather evidence before wider deployment

Question 5

A device fleet begins with 1,000 devices, and 40 have failed by time t. Using the empirical survival proportion, what is S(t)?

A. 0.04

B. 0.40

C. 0.96

D. 1.04

Correct Answer: C. 0.96

Question 6

Which statement best describes a digital twin?

A. A physical duplicate manufactured for testing

B. A software representation containing relevant asset identity, state, history, and relationships

C. A spreadsheet containing only purchase prices

D. A firmware image stored in a bootloader

Correct Answer: B. A software representation containing relevant asset identity, state, history, and relationships

Question 7

Which approach best reduces the risk of a single-source component?

A. Remove all manufacturing tests

B. Document alternatives, lifecycle status, and redesign or inventory mitigation

C. Use an unknown counterfeit supplier

D. Prevent all firmware updates

Correct Answer: B. Document alternatives, lifecycle status, and redesign or inventory mitigation

Question 8

What is RISC-V?

A. A mandatory cloud protocol for smart homes

B. A battery chemistry

C. An open instruction-set architecture

D. A predictive-maintenance algorithm

Correct Answer: C. An open instruction-set architecture

Question 9

Which is a central concern for autonomous edge systems?

A. They must always depend on a remote cloud connection.

B. They require no validation after deployment.

C. Their decisions need bounded authority, safe fallback, and appropriate human oversight.

D. They eliminate the need for sensors.

Correct Answer: C. Their decisions need bounded authority, safe fallback, and appropriate human oversight.

Question 10

In the illustrative cold-chain case, why was local threshold detection retained?

A. To avoid measuring temperature

B. To preserve essential alerting when cloud connectivity is unavailable

C. To disable all fleet monitoring

D. To replace device authentication

Correct Answer: B. To preserve essential alerting when cloud connectivity is unavailable

Embedded Systems for IoT
Chapter 15 of 15