Hazard Identification and Risk Decision-Making

Introduction and Context

Construction projects operate in changing environments in which people, plant, materials, temporary works, information and organisational decisions interact. Unlike many manufacturing processes, construction work is often temporary, geographically dispersed and exposed to weather, incomplete information, subcontracting and frequent changes in sequence. These characteristics make hazard identification and risk decision-making central functions of construction safety management.

A hazard is a source, situation or act with the potential to cause harm. Risk is the combination of the likelihood of an unwanted event and the severity of its consequences. The distinction is important: a hazard may exist without an incident occurring, while risk expresses the significance of the possible outcome under stated conditions. Effective risk management is therefore not simply the preparation of documents. It is a disciplined process of understanding uncertainty, selecting proportionate controls, allocating responsibility and verifying that controls remain effective.

This chapter develops a professional framework using hazard identification (HAZID), job safety analysis (JSA), risk matrices, bow-tie analysis, failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA), and the principle of reducing risk to as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP). These methods are complementary rather than interchangeable. HAZID provides broad early coverage; JSA examines task execution; risk matrices support prioritisation; bow-tie analysis explains prevention and mitigation; FMEA examines how components or process steps can fail; and ALARP supports defensible decisions about residual risk.

Learning Objectives

By the end of this chapter, the learner should be able to:

1. Distinguish hazards, initiating events, consequences, controls, risk and residual risk.

2. Plan and conduct a structured HAZID and JSA.

3. Use risk matrices critically and communicate their limitations.

4. Construct and interpret bow-tie and FMEA analyses.

5. Apply the hierarchy of controls and ALARP to risk decisions.

6. Integrate human, organisational, environmental and contractor-related factors.

7. Communicate risk decisions through registers, control owners, escalation criteria and assurance activities.

Foundations of Risk Decision-Making

Hazard, event, consequence and control

A useful causal chain is:

Hazard → initiating event → top event → consequence

For example, stored energy in a suspended load is the hazard. Failure of a lifting accessory or an unsafe person entering the exclusion zone may be an initiating event. Loss of load control is the top event. Crushing, fatal injury, equipment damage or project interruption are consequences.

Controls should be linked to specific points in this chain. A lifting plan and certified accessories may prevent the top event; an exclusion zone may prevent exposure; emergency response may reduce the severity after an injury. A control is credible only when its purpose, owner, performance standard and verification method are clear.

Inherent and residual risk

Inherent risk describes the exposure before specified controls are considered. Residual risk is the exposure after controls are implemented and assumed to function. The distinction prevents a common error: assigning a low rating merely because a proposed control has been written in a method statement. A control should reduce risk in the assessment only when it is specific, feasible and capable of verification.

Risk decisions should also recognise uncertainty. A low-frequency event may have severe consequences, poor data and considerable model uncertainty. Numerical precision should not be confused with knowledge. Professional judgement, consultation and conservative assumptions are necessary where evidence is limited.

The hierarchy of controls

The preferred order of control is:

1. Elimination – remove the hazard, such as designing out work at height.

2. Substitution – replace it with a less hazardous process or material.

3. Engineering controls – isolate people from the hazard through guarding, edge protection, interlocks or physical separation.

4. Administrative controls – use planning, procedures, permits, training, supervision and scheduling.

5. Personal protective equipment (PPE) – protect the individual when higher-level controls do not fully control exposure.

The hierarchy is not a checklist in which PPE is added automatically. It is a preference for controls that are less dependent on memory, compliance and perfect human performance. Administrative controls remain important, but they are generally more vulnerable to production pressure, communication failure and workforce turnover.

Hazard Identification (HAZID)

HAZID is a structured, multidisciplinary examination used to identify hazards, initiating events, consequences and preliminary safeguards. It is particularly valuable during feasibility, design, procurement, construction planning and major change. Its purpose is breadth and early influence, not detailed analysis of every task.

Preparing a HAZID

The study should define:

• the physical and organisational boundaries;
• the project phase and assumptions;
• drawings, schedules, temporary works information and site constraints;
• participants and their areas of competence;
• guidewords or hazard categories;
• risk-ranking criteria and escalation rules; and
• the required outputs and action close-out process.

A competent team normally includes construction management, design, engineering, operations or client representatives, safety professionals, supervisors and, where relevant, specialist contractors and worker representatives. A workshop dominated by one discipline can produce systematic blind spots.

HAZID procedure

A practical sequence is:

1. Divide the project into locations, systems, activities or lifecycle stages.

2. Examine each element using categories such as energy, movement, materials, environment, human factors, interfaces and emergency conditions.

3. Record the hazard, initiating event, consequence, existing controls and risk rating.

4. Identify additional controls using the hierarchy of controls.

5. Assign an owner, due date and verification requirement to each action.

6. Reassess residual risk after credible controls are defined.

7. Communicate significant findings to design, procurement, planning and site teams.

Useful prompts include: What can fall, collapse, move, ignite, release energy, contaminate, overload, isolate a person, or prevent escape? What changes during night work, adverse weather, simultaneous operations, handover or emergency response?

HAZID outputs

The principal output is a live hazard register. A high-quality register does not merely list hazards; it records scenarios, affected persons, existing barriers, assumptions, decision status, responsible owners and evidence of completion. Actions should be written as verifiable outcomes—for example, “install and inspect engineered edge protection before access”—rather than vague statements such as “take care.”

Job Safety Analysis

JSA, also called task risk assessment or job hazard analysis, examines how a particular job will be performed. It is narrower and more operational than HAZID. A JSA is most effective when developed with the people who perform the work and when it reflects the actual sequence, tools, interfaces and site conditions.

Conducting a JSA

The task is divided into logical steps, not excessively small actions. For each step, the team identifies hazards, possible consequences, required controls and the person responsible for implementation. The analysis should include preparation, execution, interruption, abnormal conditions and completion.

For example, a task involving installation of a façade panel may include delivery and unloading, movement to the workface, connection to lifting equipment, positioning, temporary support, fixing, release of the lifting gear and removal of tools. Hazards include vehicle interaction, suspended loads, dropped objects, unstable temporary support, sharp edges, weather and simultaneous work below.

A JSA should be reviewed when the work method, equipment, personnel, weather, design, sequence or surrounding activity changes. A pre-start briefing is not a substitute for sound planning, but it is an important opportunity to confirm that controls are understood and still applicable.

Strengths and limitations

JSA makes risk information accessible to supervisors and workers and links controls to the actual work sequence. Its limitations include routine normalisation, inadequate worker participation, copying from previous documents and failure to account for interaction between tasks. A JSA can also become a compliance document if the work is allowed to proceed despite unclosed high-risk actions.

Risk Matrices and Prioritisation

A common qualitative model represents risk as:

Risk rating = likelihood category × consequence category

This is a ranking convention, not a physical law and not necessarily a true probability of loss. The multiplication is meaningful only when the categories are clearly defined and used consistently. Likelihood may refer to the chance of an event during a task, a project phase or a specified exposure period; that basis must be stated.

A five-by-five matrix may assign likelihood scores from 1 (rare) to 5 (almost certain) and consequence scores from 1 (insignificant) to 5 (catastrophic). A score of 15 could result from likelihood 3 and consequence 5, or likelihood 5 and consequence 3. These scenarios are not equivalent: one may require stronger prevention, while the other may require better mitigation and emergency planning.

Worked example: use and interpretation of a matrix

Suppose a project uses a 1–5 matrix. Before additional controls, a temporary excavation has likelihood 4 and consequence 5 because collapse is credible and could cause multiple fatalities. The rating is:

R = 4 × 5 = 20.

After engineered shoring, exclusion zones, competent-person inspections and controlled access are implemented, the assessment team judges likelihood to be 2 while consequence remains 5. The residual rating is:

R = 2 × 5 = 10.

The arithmetic indicates a lower ranking, but it does not prove that the risk is acceptable. The consequence remains catastrophic, the likelihood estimate depends on control performance, and the matrix may require escalation for any scenario with catastrophic consequences. Evidence such as design calculations, installation inspection and daily records is needed to support the decision.

Limitations of matrices

Risk matrices can create false precision, mask differences between high-consequence and frequent low-consequence events, and encourage boundary effects. A rating of 9 may be treated differently from 10 even when the underlying estimates are uncertain. Matrices also tend to focus on immediate safety outcomes and may overlook occupational health, environmental harm, reputation, legal exposure and cumulative effects.

Accordingly, matrices should support—not replace—scenario analysis, legal requirements, engineering judgement, worker consultation and ALARP reasoning. Catastrophic hazards should be subject to specific controls and senior review regardless of a numerical score.

Bow-Tie Analysis

Bow-tie analysis is a visual model linking causes to a top event and consequences. On the left are threats and preventive barriers; in the centre is the top event; on the right are consequences and mitigative barriers. Escalation factors explain how barriers may fail, while critical-control information specifies what must be present and effective.

Consider excavation collapse. The hazard is unstable ground. Threats include unsupported sides, water ingress, surcharge loading and defective shoring. The top event is loss of excavation stability. Preventive barriers include geotechnical assessment, battered or shored sides, spoil-setback requirements, drainage and inspections. Consequences include burial, fatality, utility damage and project delay. Mitigative barriers include exclusion, rescue planning, emergency communication and medical response.

Bow-ties are particularly useful for communicating major accident scenarios to managers and workers because they show how controls contribute to prevention or consequence reduction. They also support barrier assurance: each critical barrier should have an owner, performance standard, inspection or test, and response when degraded.

A weakness is that bow-ties may appear more complete than they are. They can oversimplify dynamic interactions, common-cause failures and human adaptation. Workshops should therefore test whether barriers are independent, whether their failure modes are understood and whether emergency barriers are realistic under site conditions.

Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA)

FMEA is a systematic, bottom-up method for examining how components, process steps or activities can fail. For each item, the team identifies the function, failure mode, effect, cause, existing controls and recommended action. Traditional FMEA often scores severity (S), occurrence (O) and detectability (D), each on an agreed scale.

A conventional risk priority number is:

RPN = S × O × D

where S, O and D are ordinal scores defined by the organisation. RPN is a prioritisation aid, not a probability and not a measure with physical units. It assumes that the scoring scales and their interpretation are suitable. Different combinations can produce the same RPN, and a severe but infrequent failure may receive the same number as a minor but frequent failure. Therefore, high-severity items should receive attention even when their RPN is modest.

Illustrative FMEA

For a tower crane lifting operation, one process failure mode is “load moment limiter unavailable or bypassed.” The effect may be overload and structural instability; causes may include defective sensors, poor maintenance or unauthorised override. Existing controls may include pre-use checks, maintenance and interlocks. A project team might assign S = 5, O = 2 and D = 4, giving:

RPN = 5 × 2 × 4 = 40.

The important decision is not the number alone. The team should specify controls such as a functional test before use, prohibition of bypassing, competent maintenance and stop-work criteria. If safety-critical detection is unavailable, the operation should not proceed merely because the occurrence score is low.

FMEA is well suited to equipment reliability, temporary works components, lifting systems, plant interfaces and process controls. It is less effective as the sole method for complex social, environmental or multi-party scenarios. Fault-tree analysis or bow-tie analysis may better represent combinations of failures and barrier relationships.

ALARP and Defensible Risk Decisions

ALARP means reducing risk to a level at which further reduction would require a sacrifice that is grossly disproportionate to the risk reduction achieved. The principle does not mean reducing risk until it is absolutely zero, which is generally impossible. Nor does it permit an organisation to reject a reasonable control simply because it is inconvenient or costly.

An ALARP decision should consider:

• the severity and likelihood of harm;
• legal and client requirements;
• recognised good practice and relevant standards;
• available engineering and technological controls;
• the effectiveness and independence of existing barriers;
• the cost, time and practicality of additional measures; and
• the degree of uncertainty in the assessment.

For high-consequence hazards, the burden of justification increases. If a feasible control is recognised good practice, it should normally be implemented without attempting to trade it away through a simplistic cost calculation. Cost-benefit reasoning may support decisions about further measures, but monetary valuation of fatality or serious injury raises ethical and governance concerns and should never be used to justify non-compliance.

A defensible ALARP record states the scenario, assumptions, controls considered, rejected alternatives, reasons for rejection, evidence of good practice, residual risk and approval authority. It also identifies triggers for reassessment. Acceptance must be made by a person with suitable authority and competence; a worker should never be placed in the position of personally accepting organisational risk without meaningful control over the conditions.

Integrating the Methods

These methods can be arranged across the project lifecycle:

• Concept and design: HAZID, design reviews, constructability studies and elimination of hazards.
• Planning and procurement: bow-tie analysis for major scenarios, temporary works review, contractor capability assessment and FMEA for critical equipment.
• Work preparation: JSA, lifting plans, permits, interface planning and emergency arrangements.
• Execution: pre-start verification, inspections, observations, monitoring and management of change.
• Learning and improvement: incident investigation, barrier-failure analysis, trend review and revision of risk assessments.

The methods should share consistent terminology and scenario identifiers. A hazard register can point to a JSA, bow-tie or FMEA, while the JSA can identify critical controls from the bow-tie. This prevents multiple disconnected assessments that contain conflicting assumptions.

Human, Organisational and Interface Factors

Many construction incidents arise from interactions rather than isolated technical defects. Relevant factors include schedule pressure, inadequate supervision, fatigue, competence, language, workforce turnover, subcontracting, poor design information, procurement choices and unclear authority. A risk assessment that states “operator error” without examining why the error was likely is incomplete.

Human-centred analysis asks whether the task is understandable, physically practicable and tolerant of predictable error. Organisational analysis asks whether production objectives, incentives and reporting arrangements support safe decisions. Interface analysis examines handovers between designer and contractor, principal contractor and subcontractor, or adjacent work teams.

Worker participation is both an ethical requirement and a source of operational knowledge. Workers often understand variability, awkward access, informal workarounds and early warning signs that are absent from formal documents. Participation must be genuine: concerns should be recorded, responded to and protected from retaliation.

Communication, Assurance and Change

Risk communication should be adapted to its audience. Managers need exposure trends, critical-control status and unresolved decisions. Supervisors need sequencing, boundaries, stop-work criteria and escalation routes. Workers need practical controls, hazards, interfaces and emergency actions. Visual aids, translated information, demonstrations and briefings may be necessary where literacy or language barriers exist.

Assurance is the process of checking that controls exist and perform as intended. It may include design verification, inspection, testing, observation, interviews, document review and leading indicators. Counting completed risk assessments is a weak indicator. More meaningful measures include the percentage of critical controls verified on time, overdue high-risk actions, repeated barrier failures and the quality of corrective action.

Management of change is essential because risk assessments are often valid only for stated assumptions. Changes in design, method, sequence, material, contractor, weather, access, neighbouring work or schedule should trigger review. Emergency conditions and unplanned deviations require stop-and-reassess authority, not automatic reliance on an obsolete JSA.

Applied Case: Riverside Interchange Construction

Background

The following is an illustrative case. A contractor is constructing a new urban rail interchange. The work includes a deep excavation beside an operating road, installation of precast beams over the excavation and simultaneous utility relocation. Several subcontractors work under a compressed programme.

Problem

A preliminary risk register rated excavation collapse as “medium” because the design included sheet piles. A separate lifting JSA rated beam placement as “medium” because the crane operator was experienced. A review found that the assessments did not consider surcharge loads from traffic, groundwater, crane proximity to the excavation, or simultaneous utility work. No single owner was assigned to control the interfaces.

Analysis

A multidisciplinary HAZID divided the project into excavation, traffic interface, lifting, utilities and emergency response. The team identified the top event “loss of excavation stability” and developed a bow-tie. Threats included inadequate bracing installation, groundwater, traffic vibration, crane outrigger loading and unauthorised access. Escalation factors included rainfall, incomplete survey information and schedule pressure.

An FMEA of the temporary bracing process identified failure modes including incorrect brace installation, missing connection bolts and delayed inspection. The team then used JSAs for brace installation and beam lifting. The risk matrix was retained for prioritisation, but catastrophic scenarios were automatically escalated for engineering approval.

Approach and solution

The project changed the sequence to install verified shoring before heavy traffic was permitted nearby. A designed crane platform and outrigger exclusion zone were introduced. Survey and utility information was verified before excavation. Hold points required inspection of each bracing stage, and groundwater monitoring was installed. Beam lifting was prohibited during defined wind conditions and during conflicting utility operations. A single interface manager coordinated the work fronts, while supervisors and worker representatives participated in daily control verification.

Critical controls were assigned owners and performance standards. For example, the temporary works engineer owned design verification; the construction manager owned sequencing; and the lifting supervisor owned exclusion-zone compliance and pre-use checks. Emergency exercises tested rescue access, communication and coordination with public authorities.

Outcome

The project recorded several control deviations, including one instance of an incomplete brace connection and one unauthorised vehicle entering an exclusion zone. Both were detected before harm occurred through inspections and observations. The risk register was updated, and the deviations were treated as evidence about barrier performance rather than as proof that the assessment was unnecessary.

Learning points

The case demonstrates that risk ratings alone do not manage risk. HAZID exposed interfaces, bow-tie analysis clarified critical barriers, FMEA examined component and process failures, and JSA translated decisions into work steps. The case also shows why design, planning, supervision and worker participation must be integrated.

Challenges and Limitations

No method eliminates uncertainty. Rare events have limited data; risk scores can be influenced by group dynamics; workshops may exclude vulnerable workers; and controls may degrade after the assessment. Excessive documentation can create administrative burden without improving field conditions. Conversely, brief assessments may omit important assumptions.

The quality of a method depends on competence, evidence, independence and follow-through. Organisations should avoid “assessment inflation,” in which every activity receives the same lengthy form. Effort should be proportionate to potential harm, complexity and uncertainty. High-risk work requires technical verification and senior governance, not only additional paperwork.

Technology, Digital Tools and AI

Digital risk registers can link hazards to drawings, work packages, inspections and action owners. Mobile applications support field verification and time-stamped evidence. Building information modelling can assist spatial coordination and identify clashes or access constraints. Sensors and computer vision may detect proximity, movement or environmental conditions, but their outputs require validation and human oversight.

AI may help classify incident reports, identify recurring hazards, compare revisions or prompt reviewers about missing information. It should not be treated as an autonomous risk acceptor. Training-data bias, false negatives, privacy, cybersecurity, explainability and overreliance are significant concerns. Safety-critical decisions require competent human review, traceable assumptions and a clear override or stop-work process.

Governance, Ethics and Regulatory Considerations

Specific legal requirements differ by jurisdiction, but construction organisations generally have duties to identify hazards, provide safe systems of work, consult workers, protect the public, control contractors and maintain suitable emergency arrangements. Risk assessment cannot be used to authorise an activity prohibited by law, permit or engineering requirement.

Ethically, safety decisions should respect human dignity and avoid shifting risk to workers who have the least power to refuse unsafe work. Contractors should not be selected solely on price where capability and safety resources are inadequate. Records should be truthful, accessible and protected from manipulation. Confidential reporting and fair treatment encourage learning, while blame-focused systems encourage concealment.

Best-Practice Decision Process

A robust process is to:

1. Define the activity, people exposed, boundaries and assumptions.

2. Identify hazards and credible initiating events using multidisciplinary input.

3. Describe top events and consequences rather than relying on vague hazard labels.

4. Apply elimination and engineering controls before administrative measures and PPE.

5. Select an appropriate method: HAZID, JSA, bow-tie, FMEA or a combination.

6. Rank scenarios using transparent criteria, while considering catastrophic potential separately.

7. Test control effectiveness, ownership, independence and degradation modes.

8. Decide whether residual risk is tolerable and whether it is ALARP.

9. Communicate controls, limits, stop-work criteria and emergency actions.

10. Verify performance in the field and review after change, learning or failure.

Chapter Summary

Hazard identification and risk decision-making are structured professional activities that connect project design, planning and field execution. HAZID provides broad, multidisciplinary identification of hazards and interfaces. JSA translates risk information into task-level controls. Risk matrices help prioritise scenarios but do not establish safety or acceptability by arithmetic alone. Bow-tie analysis explains threats, top events, consequences and critical barriers, while FMEA examines failure modes in components and process steps. ALARP provides a disciplined basis for deciding whether further risk reduction is reasonably practicable.

Effective decisions depend on the hierarchy of controls, worker participation, competent ownership, evidence of control performance and management of change. Human and organisational factors must be addressed alongside technical hazards. Digital tools and AI can improve visibility and analysis, but they require validation, governance and human accountability. The central professional obligation is to make risk decisions that are technically sound, ethically defensible, legally compliant and demonstrably effective in the workplace.

Key Terms

Hazard: A source, situation or act with potential to cause harm.

Risk: The combination of likelihood and consequence of an unwanted event.

Inherent risk: Risk assessed before specified additional controls are applied.

Residual risk: Risk remaining after controls are implemented.

HAZID: A structured multidisciplinary hazard identification study.

Job Safety Analysis: A task-based examination of steps, hazards and controls.

Initiating event: An event that starts a causal sequence.

Top event: The point at which control over a hazard is lost.

Consequence: The harm or loss resulting from an event.

Barrier: A control that prevents an event or limits its consequences.

Bow-tie analysis: A model connecting threats, barriers, top event and consequences.

FMEA: A systematic analysis of failure modes, effects, causes and controls.

Risk matrix: A categorical tool for ranking likelihood and consequence.

ALARP: Reduction of risk to a level where further reduction requires grossly disproportionate sacrifice.

Hierarchy of controls: The preferred order from elimination to PPE.

Critical control: A control essential to preventing a serious event or limiting its consequence.

Escalation factor: A condition that increases the likelihood of barrier failure.

Management of change: A process for reassessing risk when conditions or assumptions change.

Assurance: Verification that controls exist and perform as intended.

Residual-risk acceptance: A formal decision that remaining risk is tolerable and adequately controlled.

Review Questions

Short Answer Questions

1. Distinguish a hazard from a risk and give one construction example.

2. What is the main difference between HAZID and JSA?

3. Why should PPE generally be considered after higher-level controls?

4. What information does the centre of a bow-tie diagram represent?

5. Why is an FMEA risk priority number not a probability?

Long Answer Questions

1. Explain how a multidisciplinary HAZID should be planned, conducted and converted into an actionable hazard register.

2. Discuss the strengths and limitations of risk matrices in construction safety management.

3. Explain ALARP and identify the evidence required for a defensible residual-risk decision.

4. Compare bow-tie analysis and FMEA in terms of purpose, structure, outputs and limitations.

5. Describe how human, organisational and contractor-interface factors can influence construction risk decisions.

Analytical / Application Questions

1. A contractor proposes to control façade installation using a toolbox talk, harnesses and supervision. Apply the hierarchy of controls and recommend a stronger control strategy, explaining your reasoning.

2. Develop a bow-tie outline for a crane overturning event, including at least four threats, four preventive barriers, three consequences and three mitigative barriers.

3. A risk matrix gives a catastrophic excavation scenario a rating of 10 after controls are introduced. Explain why the project should not accept the risk from the number alone and identify the verification evidence you would require.

Multiple Choice Questions with Answers

Question 1

Which method is primarily intended to provide broad, multidisciplinary identification of project hazards and interfaces?

A. HAZID

B. FMEA

C. PPE selection

D. Incident cost analysis

Correct Answer: A. HAZID

Question 2

In the causal chain used in bow-tie analysis, what is the top event?

A. The original hazard

B. The point at which control over a hazard is lost

C. The final financial consequence

D. The inspection record

Correct Answer: B. The point at which control over a hazard is lost

Question 3

A scenario has a likelihood score of 4 and a consequence score of 5 on a matrix using multiplication. What is its risk rating?

A. 9

B. 15

C. 20

D. 25

Correct Answer: C. 20

Question 4

Which control is highest in the hierarchy of controls?

A. Personal protective equipment

B. Administrative procedure

C. Worker training

D. Elimination

Correct Answer: D. Elimination

Question 5

What is the principal focus of a job safety analysis?

A. The financial performance of a project

B. The sequence of a specific task and its controls

C. The organisation’s annual accident rate

D. The selection of a construction contract

Correct Answer: B. The sequence of a specific task and its controls

Question 6

In conventional FMEA, what does the detectability score describe?

A. The severity of the consequence

B. The frequency of worker attendance

C. The likelihood that a failure will be detected before causing harm

D. The cost of replacing equipment

Correct Answer: C. The likelihood that a failure will be detected before causing harm

Question 7

Which statement about ALARP is correct?

A. It means that all risk must be reduced to zero.

B. It permits non-compliance if a control is expensive.

C. It requires risk reduction unless further sacrifice would be grossly disproportionate to the benefit.

D. It is identical to accepting every risk below a matrix score of 10.

Correct Answer: C. It requires risk reduction unless further sacrifice would be grossly disproportionate to the benefit.

Question 8

Which item is most appropriate as a critical-control assurance activity for temporary excavation shoring?

A. Counting toolbox talks only

B. Verifying installation against the approved design and inspecting connections

C. Increasing the project advertising budget

D. Replacing the risk register with a schedule

Correct Answer: B. Verifying installation against the approved design and inspecting connections

Question 9

Why should catastrophic scenarios receive specific attention even when a matrix rating is moderate?

A. Their consequences may remain unacceptable and estimates may be uncertain.

B. Matrices always calculate catastrophic risk incorrectly.

C. Catastrophic events never have preventive controls.

D. Moderate ratings automatically prohibit all construction work.

Correct Answer: A. Their consequences may remain unacceptable and estimates may be uncertain.

Question 10

Which change should normally trigger review of a task risk assessment?

A. A change in work method or surrounding interface

B. A routine filing-name change

C. The completion of an unrelated office meeting

D. A reduction in document font size

Correct Answer: A. A change in work method or surrounding interface