Advanced Communication Networks

Chapter 9
Software-Defined, Virtualized and Intent-Based Networking

Post Graduate Program in Electronics and Communication Engineering
Advanced Communication Networks   •   Post Graduate

Software-Defined, Virtualized and Intent-Based Networking

Introduction and Context

Communication networks have traditionally been built from vertically integrated appliances. A router, firewall, load balancer, or radio controller commonly combined forwarding hardware, control software, management functions, and vendor-specific interfaces. This model provided predictable performance, but it made networks expensive to modify and difficult to automate. New services, cloud computing, 5G and 6G systems, edge computing, and large-scale data centres require networks that can be programmed, virtualized, observed, and reconfigured rapidly.

Software-defined networking (SDN), network functions virtualization (NFV), service function chaining, network slicing, orchestration, intent-based networking (IBN), and infrastructure automation address different aspects of this transformation. They are related but not synonymous. SDN separates network control from packet forwarding and exposes programmable control interfaces. NFV implements network functions as software on general-purpose infrastructure. Orchestration coordinates resources and services across domains. IBN expresses desired outcomes rather than device-level commands. Automation supplies the mechanisms for repeatable provisioning, validation, and operation.

A contemporary programmable network is therefore best understood as a socio-technical system involving architecture, protocols, software, hardware, security, operations, governance, and organizational processes.

Learning Objectives

After studying this chapter, the reader should be able to:

1. Explain SDN planes, controllers, southbound and northbound interfaces, and OpenFlow.

2. Compare centralized, distributed, and hierarchical control architectures.

3. Describe NFV, virtual network functions, containers, service chaining, and orchestration.

4. Design the main components of a network slice and evaluate isolation requirements.

5. Explain intent-based networking and the closed-loop automation lifecycle.

6. Apply infrastructure-as-code and model-driven management principles.

7. Assess interoperability, migration, reliability, security, and governance risks.

8. Select appropriate architectural and operational practices for a programmable network.

1. Architectural Foundations

1.1 The three-plane model

A useful abstraction divides networking into three planes:

  • Data plane: forwards packets according to tables, labels, rules, or programmable pipelines.
  • Control plane: computes reachability, paths, policies, and forwarding state.
  • Management plane: performs configuration, inventory, monitoring, accounting, compliance, and lifecycle administration.

In conventional networks these planes may be implemented within every device. In SDN, some control and management functions are moved into software controllers or orchestrators. The data plane remains distributed because packets must usually be forwarded locally and at line rate.

The separation is logical rather than absolute. A controller may calculate paths while a device retains local protection mechanisms. Similarly, an SDN controller is not necessarily a single physical machine; it is commonly a logically centralized, physically distributed cluster.

1.2 Control architectures

A distributed control architecture places routing and policy computation in network devices. It is resilient and mature, but global optimization and coordinated policy changes may be difficult. A centralized architecture offers a global view and simpler policy reasoning, but introduces controller scalability and availability concerns. A hierarchical or federated architecture combines local controllers with regional or domain-level coordination. This is often appropriate for wide-area, multi-cloud, and multi-operator environments.

The important design distinction is between logical centralization and physical centralization. A logically centralized controller should normally be replicated, state-synchronized, and partition-tolerant. Controller failure must not immediately interrupt forwarding, and devices should retain a defined fail-safe behavior.

1.3 SDN interfaces

The southbound interface connects a controller to forwarding devices or programmable data planes. OpenFlow is a historically important example, while NETCONF, RESTCONF, gNMI, P4Runtime, and vendor APIs are also used for configuration, telemetry, and pipeline control.

The northbound interface exposes abstractions to applications, orchestration systems, and policy engines. It may use REST APIs, gRPC, message buses, intent models, or domain-specific interfaces.

The east-west interface supports communication among controllers, orchestrators, or administrative domains. It is significant in hierarchical and multi-domain networks.

An interface is not merely a transport protocol. Its data models, error semantics, transactions, versioning, authentication, and capability discovery determine practical interoperability.

2. OpenFlow and Programmable Forwarding

OpenFlow introduced a widely discussed model in which a controller installs flow entries in a switch. A flow entry generally contains match fields, instructions or actions, counters, and priority. A switch may forward, drop, modify, mirror, or send matching packets to the controller.

A simplified processing sequence is:

1. A packet arrives at an ingress port.

2. The switch searches the applicable flow table.

3. The highest-priority matching entry is selected.

4. Actions are executed and counters are updated.

5. If no suitable entry exists, the switch follows a configured table-miss behavior.

OpenFlow is valuable for understanding SDN, but it is not a complete network operating system. It primarily describes control of forwarding behavior. It does not by itself solve topology discovery, service lifecycle management, security policy interpretation, inventory, multi-domain coordination, or operational assurance.

Modern programmable data planes may use P4 or similar technologies to define packet-processing pipelines. P4 separates the description of packet parsing and processing from the fixed-function design of a device. P4Runtime can then control a P4-defined pipeline. This provides flexibility, but it also transfers responsibility for pipeline verification, resource accounting, compiler compatibility, and performance validation to the network designer.

Worked example: flow-rule precedence

Suppose a switch has three rules:

  • Rule A: match destination prefix 10.0.0.0/8, priority 100, forward to port 1.
  • Rule B: match destination prefix 10.1.0.0/16, priority 200, forward to port 2.
  • Rule C: match all traffic, priority 1, forward to port 3.

A packet destined for 10.1.5.7 matches all three rules, but Rule B is selected because it has the highest priority. A packet destined for 10.2.5.7 matches Rules A and C, so Rule A is selected. A packet destined for 192.0.2.4 matches only Rule C. The example illustrates why policy compilation must detect overlapping rules and why priority is a security-relevant property.

3. Network APIs, Models, and Automation

Programmability is useful only when APIs are consistent and semantically meaningful. Common management approaches include:

  • CLI automation: familiar but difficult to validate and often vendor-dependent.
  • SNMP: useful for monitoring and selected configuration tasks, but limited for modern transactional configuration.
  • NETCONF and RESTCONF: model-driven configuration and retrieval, frequently using YANG data models.
  • gNMI: supports structured configuration, state retrieval, and streaming telemetry.
  • REST and gRPC APIs: commonly used by controllers and orchestration platforms.
  • Message buses: support event-driven communication at scale.

A data model defines objects, types, constraints, relationships, and operational semantics. Model-driven management reduces ambiguity, but models from different vendors may describe similar concepts differently. A translation layer or canonical information model may therefore be required.

Good API design includes authentication, authorization, idempotent operations, explicit validation, transaction boundaries, version negotiation, rate limiting, structured errors, and audit records. An operation is idempotent if repeating it produces the same intended state as performing it once. Idempotency is essential when automation retries after timeouts.

4. Network Functions Virtualization

NFV separates a network function from dedicated appliance hardware. A virtual network function (VNF) is software implementing a network function on virtual machines or virtualized infrastructure. A cloud-native network function (CNF) commonly uses containers and orchestration platforms, although the distinction is architectural rather than purely technological.

The principal NFV components are:

  • NFV infrastructure (NFVI): compute, storage, networking, virtualization, acceleration, and the underlying physical resources.
  • VNF or CNF: the software network function.
  • Virtualized infrastructure manager (VIM): manages compute, storage, and network resources in an infrastructure domain.
  • NFV orchestrator (NFVO): coordinates service and resource lifecycle across domains.
  • Element or function manager: manages configuration and operational state of a network function.
  • Service and function descriptors: machine-readable models describing deployment, connectivity, dependencies, scaling, and policies.

Virtualization provides flexibility and consolidation, but packet processing is sensitive to latency, jitter, memory locality, interrupt overhead, and I/O performance. Techniques such as CPU pinning, huge pages, SR-IOV, Data Plane Development Kit acceleration, smart NICs, and hardware offload may be required. These optimizations can reduce portability and complicate lifecycle management.

A VNF should not be evaluated only by average throughput. Relevant measures include peak and sustained throughput, packets per second, latency distribution, jitter, availability, recovery time, scaling time, resource efficiency, and observability.

5. Service Function Chaining

A service function chain (SFC) specifies an ordered or policy-dependent sequence of functions through which traffic must pass. A typical enterprise chain may contain a firewall, intrusion-prevention function, network address translator, and traffic optimizer.

The chain can be represented as:

`Classifier → Firewall → IDS/IPS → NAT → Egress`

The classifier identifies traffic using identity, application, tenant, address, port, or cryptographic context. The forwarding substrate then steers traffic to the required functions. Service Function Chaining architecture separates the logical service path from the physical placement of functions, allowing functions to be moved or scaled.

Critical design issues include state synchronization, asymmetric routing, function insertion and removal, failure bypass, ordering constraints, encryption visibility, and policy conflict. A stateful firewall cannot be arbitrarily replicated unless session state is synchronized or traffic affinity is maintained. A chain that is logically valid may also be operationally infeasible because of bandwidth, latency, licensing, or placement constraints.

6. Network Slicing and Multi-Tenancy

A network slice is a logical network with defined performance, security, and management characteristics, created over shared physical and virtual resources. Slicing is especially important in 5G and emerging 6G systems, but similar ideas apply to enterprise, data-centre, and industrial networks.

A slice may specify latency objectives, reliability, mobility behavior, geographic scope, isolation, traffic treatment, identity rules, and lifecycle policies. A slice is not simply a VLAN or virtual machine. It may span radio access, transport, core, edge, cloud, and security domains.

The major isolation dimensions are:

  • Resource isolation: separate or quota-controlled compute, memory, bandwidth, and radio resources.
  • Performance isolation: protection against noisy neighbours and congestion.
  • Security isolation: independent policy, identity, trust boundaries, and key management.
  • Fault isolation: limiting the spread of failures.
  • Management isolation: tenant-specific visibility and authorization.

Hard isolation may use dedicated resources, while soft isolation uses scheduling, quotas, traffic engineering, and admission control. Stronger isolation generally increases cost and reduces statistical multiplexing benefits. Slice admission should therefore consider worst-case resource demands, not merely average utilization.

7. Orchestration and Closed-Loop Operations

Orchestration coordinates the lifecycle of services and infrastructure. A useful decomposition is:

1. Design: define service models, policies, dependencies, and resource requirements.

2. Onboarding: validate software images, descriptors, signatures, licenses, and compatibility.

3. Instantiation: allocate resources, configure connectivity, and establish security credentials.

4. Operation: monitor health, performance, capacity, and policy compliance.

5. Scaling and healing: add resources, restart components, reroute traffic, or replace failed instances.

6. Upgrade: perform controlled changes with rollback capability.

7. Termination: remove resources, revoke credentials, and preserve required records.

A closed-loop controller follows the pattern observe–analyze–decide–act, often called OODA in operational contexts. Telemetry is collected; analytics compare observations with objectives; a policy engine selects an action; and automation applies and verifies the change.

Closed-loop automation must avoid oscillation. If a scaling policy reacts too quickly to transient load, resources may repeatedly expand and contract. Hysteresis, minimum holding times, damped thresholds, and predictive models can reduce instability. Automated action should also be bounded by safety policies and approval gates for high-impact changes.

8. Intent-Based Networking

Intent-based networking translates a high-level desired outcome into device and service configurations, then continuously verifies whether the outcome remains true. Intent is not merely a natural-language request. It must be represented by explicit semantics, constraints, scope, ownership, and measurable assurance conditions.

An IBN lifecycle includes:

  • Intent capture: express objectives such as “critical control traffic must experience low delay and remain isolated.”
  • Interpretation: translate business or operational language into formal policies.
  • Validation: detect contradictions, unsupported capabilities, and resource infeasibility.
  • Compilation: generate configurations, forwarding rules, slices, and service chains.
  • Deployment: apply changes transactionally where possible.
  • Assurance: compare observed state and telemetry with the intended state.
  • Remediation: correct drift, raise an alert, or request human intervention.

Intent compilation is a constraint problem. For example, a policy may require minimum bandwidth, maximum latency, encryption, geographic restrictions, and high availability simultaneously. If no feasible realization exists, the system should report the conflict rather than silently weakening a requirement.

Natural-language interfaces and machine learning can assist intent extraction and anomaly detection, but generated policies must be validated against formal models. Large language models can produce syntactically plausible yet unsafe configurations; they should therefore operate under least privilege, use approved schemas, and require testing and auditability.

9. Infrastructure as Code and Network Automation

Infrastructure as code (IaC) expresses infrastructure in version-controlled, reviewable files. Declarative IaC specifies the desired state; imperative automation specifies a sequence of commands. Declarative methods support drift detection and repeatability, while imperative methods remain useful for procedures that lack a suitable state model.

A professional automation pipeline commonly contains:

1. Source control and peer review.

2. Schema, syntax, and policy validation.

3. Static analysis and security checks.

4. Emulation, simulation, or testbed execution.

5. Staged deployment and canary testing.

6. Telemetry-based verification.

7. Rollback or forward-fix procedures.

8. Audit and change records.

The principle of reconciliation is central: an operator describes desired state, and a controller repeatedly works to reduce the difference between desired and observed state. Reconciliation must be carefully designed when multiple controllers can modify the same resource. Ownership, precedence, and conflict resolution must be explicit.

10. Interoperability and Migration Risk

Vendor interoperability has at least four layers:

1. Protocol interoperability: systems can exchange messages.

2. Data-model interoperability: systems interpret objects and values consistently.

3. Behavioral interoperability: systems implement the same semantics and failure behavior.

4. Operational interoperability: systems can be deployed, upgraded, monitored, and supported together.

Compliance with a standard does not guarantee interoperability. Optional features, proprietary extensions, timer differences, undocumented defaults, and inconsistent error handling frequently create problems.

Migration risk includes controller lock-in, proprietary telemetry, loss of device features, performance degradation, licensing changes, security exposure, skills shortages, and service interruption. A migration should begin with capability and dependency inventories. It should define a target architecture, coexistence period, rollback criteria, test plan, ownership model, and exit strategy.

A practical migration pattern is incremental: establish telemetry and model-driven management first; automate a low-risk domain; introduce abstraction and policy validation; then migrate selected services using parallel operation or canary deployment. Legacy devices may be integrated through adapters, but adapters can become permanent technical debt and should be governed accordingly.

11. Security, Resilience, and Governance

Programmability enlarges the attack surface. Threats include compromised controllers, malicious applications, stolen API credentials, poisoned images, insecure east-west links, privilege escalation, flow-rule manipulation, telemetry leakage, and denial of service against orchestration systems.

Controls should include mutual authentication, strong identity, role- and attribute-based authorization, secure boot, signed images, secrets management, network segmentation, immutable audit logs, vulnerability management, API rate controls, and independent policy validation. Controller clusters require quorum, backup, state consistency, and tested disaster recovery.

The data plane should continue safe forwarding during temporary controller disconnection, but the chosen fail-open or fail-closed behavior must match the service risk. Critical industrial traffic may require deterministic local protection; a security boundary may require fail-closed behavior.

Governance questions include who owns an intent, who may approve automated changes, how liability is assigned after an erroneous action, and how tenant data is separated. Regulatory requirements may apply to personal data, critical infrastructure, lawful access, supply-chain assurance, and geographical processing restrictions. Automation does not remove accountability; it changes where decisions are encoded and how they are reviewed.

12. Performance and Reliability Evaluation

A programmable network should be evaluated using both technical and operational metrics. Useful metrics include:

  • control-plane convergence time;
  • configuration deployment success rate;
  • policy compliance rate;
  • packet loss, latency, and jitter;
  • flow-installation rate;
  • service instantiation and scaling time;
  • mean time to detect and recover;
  • resource utilization and fragmentation;
  • change failure and rollback rates;
  • security-event detection and response time.

Percentiles are often more informative than averages. For example, the 99th-percentile latency reveals tail behavior that an average can conceal. Availability should be defined with a stated observation period and failure criterion; a nominally redundant controller is not highly available if state recovery is untested.

A sound experiment identifies workload, topology, traffic distribution, hardware, software versions, control policies, measurement points, and confidence limitations. Results from a laboratory virtual switch should not be generalized automatically to a high-speed production fabric.

13. Illustrative Case: Campus Network Transformation

Background

A fictional university operates a multi-building campus network with separate firewalls, wireless controllers, access switches, and research laboratories. Provisioning a new laboratory network requires manual changes on several device types and normally takes several days.

Problem

The university wants secure isolation for student, staff, research, guest, and building-automation traffic. Research projects require temporary high-bandwidth paths, while building systems require predictable connectivity and strict access control. Existing devices are from multiple vendors.

Analysis

A full replacement would create operational and financial risk. The university therefore inventories device capabilities, identifies common telemetry and configuration functions, and classifies traffic by business and safety impact. It discovers that some switches support model-driven interfaces, while older access devices require CLI adapters. The building-automation network cannot depend entirely on a remote controller during a connectivity failure.

Approach

The university deploys a redundant SDN control cluster for the supported switching domain and retains local forwarding and access-control rules on devices. A policy service expresses tenant and identity requirements. NFV hosts a virtual firewall and intrusion-prevention function at the campus edge. Service chains are applied to research and guest traffic, while building-automation traffic uses locally enforceable fail-safe policies.

Network slices are implemented as logical service domains with bandwidth quotas, separate security policies, and admission controls. Infrastructure definitions are stored in version control. Changes pass through automated validation, a laboratory test topology, and staged deployment. Legacy devices are connected through a controlled adapter, with a documented retirement plan.

Outcome

Provisioning becomes repeatable and auditable, and temporary research networks can be created without manually editing every switch. The university does not claim complete automation: high-risk building-control changes require human approval, and emergency local operation is preserved. Monitoring identifies configuration drift and verifies isolation boundaries.

Learning points

The case demonstrates that successful transformation is incremental. SDN, NFV, slicing, and intent are complementary capabilities, not interchangeable products. Local resilience, model quality, testing, and governance are as important as controller functionality. Interoperability must be measured through operational behavior rather than marketing claims.

14. Contemporary Directions and Best Practices

Current development is moving toward cloud-native network functions, disaggregated hardware, programmable accelerators, digital twins, intent assurance, edge orchestration, and multi-domain automation. AI-assisted operations are increasingly used for anomaly detection, capacity forecasting, root-cause analysis, and policy recommendation. However, explainability, data quality, adversarial robustness, and human oversight remain essential.

Recommended practices are:

1. Begin with explicit service objectives and measurable assurance conditions.

2. Separate logical control centralization from physical deployment.

3. Use open, versioned models where practical and document unavoidable proprietary dependencies.

4. Design for controller, link, function, and domain failure from the beginning.

5. Treat APIs, images, descriptors, and telemetry pipelines as security-sensitive assets.

6. Prefer small, reversible, observable changes over large migrations.

7. Test policy conflicts, overlapping rules, stateful function failures, and rollback paths.

8. Use percentiles and workload-specific measurements rather than headline throughput.

9. Maintain human approval for safety-critical or high-blast-radius actions.

10. Review technical debt, licensing exposure, skills, and exit strategies periodically.

Chapter Summary

SDN separates logical control from packet forwarding and enables programmable network behavior through controller interfaces and data models. OpenFlow provides an important flow-programming model, but modern networks also rely on NETCONF, RESTCONF, gNMI, P4Runtime, telemetry systems, and vendor APIs. NFV moves network functions into software, while service function chaining coordinates their ordered use. Network slicing creates logical, policy-controlled networks over shared resources and requires resource, performance, security, fault, and management isolation.

Orchestration manages service lifecycles, and closed-loop automation observes, analyzes, decides, acts, and verifies. Intent-based networking raises the abstraction level by translating desired outcomes into validated configurations and continuously checking compliance. Infrastructure as code, reconciliation, testing, staged deployment, and rollback make automation repeatable. Interoperability must be assessed at protocol, model, behavioral, and operational levels. Security, resilience, governance, and migration planning determine whether programmability produces dependable operational value. Contemporary systems increasingly combine cloud-native functions, programmable data planes, AI-assisted assurance, and multi-domain orchestration, but these technologies require formal validation and accountable human oversight.

Key Terms

SDN: Networking architecture that separates logical control from packet forwarding.

Data plane: Network component responsible for forwarding packets.

Control plane: Functions that compute paths, policies, and forwarding state.

Management plane: Functions for configuration, monitoring, inventory, and administration.

Southbound interface: Interface between a controller and forwarding infrastructure.

Northbound interface: Interface between a controller and applications or orchestration systems.

OpenFlow: Protocol and control model for programming flow-table behavior.

Programmable data plane: Forwarding pipeline whose packet processing can be defined or modified through software.

NFV: Implementation of network functions using software on virtualized infrastructure.

VNF: Software implementation of a virtualized network function.

CNF: Cloud-native network function commonly implemented with containers and cloud-native methods.

NFVI: Compute, storage, networking, virtualization, and physical resources supporting NFV.

Service function chain: Ordered or policy-dependent sequence of network functions.

Network slice: Logical network with defined performance, security, and management characteristics.

Orchestration: Coordinated lifecycle management of services and resources.

Intent-based networking: Networking approach that translates desired outcomes into configurations and assurance actions.

Infrastructure as code: Version-controlled, machine-readable description of infrastructure state or procedures.

Reconciliation: Repeated process of reducing the difference between desired and observed state.

Closed-loop automation: Observe–analyze–decide–act operation with feedback and verification.

Technical debt: Future cost created by temporary, proprietary, or poorly maintainable design choices.

Review Questions

Short Answer Questions

1. Distinguish the data, control, and management planes.

2. What are the principal purposes of southbound and northbound interfaces?

3. Why is OpenFlow not a complete network operating system?

4. Define a network slice and identify two isolation dimensions.

5. What is reconciliation in infrastructure automation?

Long Answer Questions

1. Explain SDN architecture and compare centralized, distributed, and hierarchical control.

2. Describe NFV architecture, including NFVI, VNFs or CNFs, managers, and orchestrators.

3. Explain the lifecycle of intent-based networking from intent capture to assurance.

4. Discuss service function chaining and the operational challenges of stateful functions.

5. Evaluate the security and governance requirements of programmable networks.

Analytical / Application Questions

1. Design an SDN/NFV architecture for a hospital network carrying clinical, guest, administrative, and medical-IoT traffic. Specify control placement, isolation, service chains, and failure behavior.

2. A legacy multi-vendor campus network is to be migrated to intent-based automation. Develop a phased migration plan that addresses interoperability testing, adapters, rollback, security, and staff capability.

3. A slice requires high reliability, low latency, encryption, and geographic restriction, but available edge resources are limited. Explain how the orchestrator should validate feasibility, resolve conflicts, and report an infeasible request.

Multiple Choice Questions with Answers

Question 1

Which plane is primarily responsible for packet forwarding at line rate?

A. Management plane

B. Data plane

C. Application plane

D. Orchestration plane

Correct Answer: B. Data plane

Question 2

What is the main role of a southbound interface in SDN?

A. Connecting users to applications

B. Connecting controllers to forwarding infrastructure

C. Replacing all routing protocols

D. Providing physical power to switches

Correct Answer: B. Connecting controllers to forwarding infrastructure

Question 3

A packet matches three flow rules with priorities 10, 50, and 100. Which rule is normally selected when all other selection conditions are equal?

A. Priority 10

B. Priority 50

C. Priority 100

D. The oldest rule

Correct Answer: C. Priority 100

Question 4

Which component belongs to NFV infrastructure?

A. Physical compute and networking resources

B. Business-intent document only

C. User password database only

D. A routing policy without execution resources

Correct Answer: A. Physical compute and networking resources

Question 5

What is a service function chain?

A. A sequence of network functions applied to traffic

B. A list of physical cable manufacturers

C. A controller election algorithm

D. A database backup schedule

Correct Answer: A. A sequence of network functions applied to traffic

Question 6

Which statement best describes network slicing?

A. It is limited to changing a host name

B. It creates logical networks with defined service characteristics over shared resources

C. It eliminates the need for security policy

D. It always requires completely separate physical networks

Correct Answer: B. It creates logical networks with defined service characteristics over shared resources

Question 7

Which sequence correctly represents a closed-loop automation pattern?

A. Act, delete, observe, ignore

B. Observe, analyze, decide, act

C. Compile, power off, route, archive

D. Authenticate, encrypt, compress, print

Correct Answer: B. Observe, analyze, decide, act

Question 8

What is a key property of an idempotent automation operation?

A. It produces a different result every time

B. Repeating it produces the same intended state

C. It can only be executed manually

D. It never requires authentication

Correct Answer: B. Repeating it produces the same intended state

Question 9

Which interoperability layer concerns whether two systems interpret configuration objects consistently?

A. Physical interoperability

B. Data-model interoperability

C. Power interoperability

D. Geographical interoperability

Correct Answer: B. Data-model interoperability

Question 10

Why should AI-generated network configurations be validated before deployment?

A. They are always too slow to transmit

B. They may be syntactically plausible but operationally unsafe

C. They cannot represent any policy

D. Validation prevents all future failures

Correct Answer: B. They may be syntactically plausible but operationally unsafe

Advanced Communication Networks
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